Unverified Commit d1ac5613 authored by teor's avatar teor
Browse files

Entry Nodes: Use a reasonably live consensus to select guards 

Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
parent a9820f07

changes/bug24661

0 → 100644
+3 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
  o Minor bugfixes (client, guard selection):

    - When Tor's consensus has expired, but is still reasonably live, use it

      to select guards. Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.

src/feature/client/entrynodes.c

+17 −10
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ create_initial_guard_context(void) 
  guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;

  const char *name = choose_guard_selection(

                             get_options(),

                             networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),

                             networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(

                                                    approx_time(),

                                                    usable_consensus_flavor()),

                             NULL,

                             &type);

  tor_assert(name); // "name" can only be NULL if we had an old name.
@@ -726,7 +728,9 @@ update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options) 
  guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;

  const char *new_name = choose_guard_selection(

                             options,

                             networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),

                             networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(

                                                    approx_time(),

                                                    usable_consensus_flavor()),

                             curr_guard_context,

                             &type);

  tor_assert(new_name);
@@ -1125,14 +1129,16 @@ select_and_add_guard_item_for_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, 
 * or if we don't need a consensus because we're using bridges.)

 */

static int

live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs)

reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs)

{

  tor_assert(gs);

  if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {

    /* We don't update bridges from the consensus; they aren't there. */

    return 0;

  }

  return networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()) == NULL;

  return networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(

                                            approx_time(),

                                            usable_consensus_flavor()) == NULL;

}



/**
@@ -1147,9 +1153,9 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs) 
  tor_assert(gs);

  const or_options_t *options = get_options();



  if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {

  if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {

    log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not expanding the sample guard set; we have "

             "no live consensus.");

             "no reasonably live consensus.");

    return NULL;

  }
@@ -1395,11 +1401,12 @@ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(guard_selection_t *gs) 
{

  tor_assert(gs);



  // It's important to use only a live consensus here; we don't want to

  // make changes based on anything expired or old.

  if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {

  // It's important to use a reasonably live consensus here; we want clients

  // to bootstrap even if their clock is skewed by more than 2-3 hours.

  // But we don't want to make changes based on anything that's really old.

  if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {

    log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not updating the sample guard set; we have "

             "no live consensus.");

             "no reasonably live consensus.");

    return;

  }

  log_info(LD_GUARD, "Updating sampled guard status based on received "