Tor issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues2022-10-11T23:39:35Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40245Assist dir auths with vote visibility2022-10-11T23:39:35ZRoger DingledineAssist dir auths with vote visibilityI've been accumulating a pile of local patches on moria1, specifically around logging more details during voting, and it seems smart to get them into the hands of the other dir auths too.I've been accumulating a pile of local patches on moria1, specifically around logging more details during voting, and it seems smart to get them into the hands of the other dir auths too.Tor: 0.4.5.x-stableRoger DingledineRoger Dingledinehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/2667Exits should block reentry into the tor network2023-08-23T19:53:08ZMike PerryExits should block reentry into the tor networkWith proposal 110, we blocked the ability of Tor clients to use the Tor protocol for an unbounded amplification attack to destroy the Tor network. However, we still have not completely prevented this attack. It is still possible to tunne...With proposal 110, we blocked the ability of Tor clients to use the Tor protocol for an unbounded amplification attack to destroy the Tor network. However, we still have not completely prevented this attack. It is still possible to tunnel tor over tor by using exits to connect back to other tor nodes. This property can still be used to execute the unbounded amplification attack on the Tor network, or just on the tor directory authorities.
One fix for this would be to add code to exit nodes to implicitly add all of the IP + ORport combinations of all other relays to their exit policy reject lines, or otherwise block this connection at some other level.David Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orgDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40253Extend the DoS subsystem to block addrs that connect too often too2022-10-11T23:39:35ZRoger DingledineExtend the DoS subsystem to block addrs that connect too often tooRight now we have a connection-based DoS component which triggers on *concurrent* ORPort connections. That is, *if* you have 3 concurrent connections *and* you [write me more]Right now we have a connection-based DoS component which triggers on *concurrent* ORPort connections. That is, *if* you have 3 concurrent connections *and* you [write me more]Tor: 0.4.6.x-freezeDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orgDavid Gouletdgoulet@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40265Rebuild fallbackdir list January 20212021-04-15T12:51:30ZGeorge KadianakisRebuild fallbackdir list January 2021Tor: 0.4.6.x-stableGeorge KadianakisGeorge Kadianakis