tor2web mode for accessing hidden services
When the Tor client accesses a hidden service, it makes sure to get anonymity on its side, and the hidden service makes sure to get anonymity on its side.
How much of the crappy reachability properties for hidden services is due to the client-side circuits?
We should design a mode where the client either uses a one-hop rendezvous path, or uses itself as the rendezvous point. (We could imagine leaving alone the 3-hop circuit to fetch the rendezvous descriptor and the 3-hop circuit to reach the introduction point, on the theory that they're not critical-path once the connection is established; or we could ponder cutting them down some too on the theory that connection establishment is the critical path.)
Should be a new config option and a few changes to various constants. How could it go wrong? :)
Once we have it working, we should set up an alternate hidserv torperf (a la legacy/trac#1944 (closed)) to see how the designs compare.
Once we have some answers, we'll want to ponder if this is really something we want to leave in for arbitrary users to shoot themselves in the foot with (cf attractive nuisance).