After start tor- in few minutes CPU load 100% and hidden service unavailable. If disable concrete hidden service and restart tor- all normal. Problem very same as https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035807.html In log many same records: Mar 26 10:57:48.000 [notice] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:8333. Giving up. Mar 26 10:58:26.000 [notice] We tried for 15 seconds to connect to '[scrubbed]' using exit $3EAAAB35932610411E24FA4317603CB5780B80BC~AccessNow002 at 176.10.99.201. Retrying on a new circuit. Mar 26 10:58:42.000 [notice] We tried for 15 seconds to connect to '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit. Mar 26 10:59:04.000 [notice] Closing stream for '[scrubbed].onion': hidden service is unavailable (try again later). Mar 26 11:01:21.000 [notice] Tried for 130 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:8333. Giving up. Mar 26 11:02:05.000 [notice] Tried for 123 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Mar 26 11:02:05.000 [notice] Tried for 123 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Mar 26 11:02:05.000 [notice] Tried for 121 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Mar 26 11:02:05.000 [notice] Tried for 129 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Mar 26 11:02:05.000 [notice] Tried for 124 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Mar 26 11:02:18.000 [notice] Tried for 131 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:0. Giving up. (waiting for circuit) Or Mar 26 11:02:51.000 [notice] Your Guard torpidsUKuk2 ($C9933B3725239B6FAB5227BA33B30BE7B48BB485) is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are 116/171. Use counts are 48/49. 117 circuits completed, 1 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 126 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is 87 seconds. Absolutely same situation as https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035833.html ----- use little bandwidth, and seem to involve each request having a new rendezvous for each attempt, using lots of resources ----- Problem exist at all versions(0.2.5, 0.2.6, master from git) At current time few hidden services in TOR network DDOSed by this method. **Trac**: **Username**: alberto