Tim's tests show that GFW is probing v2/v3 bridges based on the Tor cipher list. Tor is using 28 static ciphers (`src/common/ciphers.inc`) for the SSL ClientHello of the v2/v3 link handshakes, and GFW seems to get agitated by them. The question mark in the ticket title reflects the fact that this is not 100% verified, even though Tim dodged probing by simply removing two ciphersuites from `ciphers.inc` [0], when the same ClientHello, but with full ciphers.inc, was always getting probed (IIRC). Tim said he is gonna look into this soon-ish, so that the question mark can be removed from the title. In any case, this ticket is to find a good tactic to remove this static fingerprint from Tor's SSL handshake. My patch in [0] might do it, but it doesn't seem very future-proof. We should probably see what Firefox does, and hope that it doesn't interfere with v2 signalling. [0]: ``` diff --git a/src/common/ciphers.inc b/src/common/ciphers.inc index c84620d..99ec494 100644 --- a/src/common/ciphers.inc +++ b/src/common/ciphers.inc @@ -111,16 +111,6 @@ #else XCIPHER(0xc012, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0x0013, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0x0013, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA CIPHER(0xc00d, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #else ```