Confirm that the strange onionoo flood is resolved
Context part one: Georgetown and NRL et al have a paper at IMC 2018 that found "that ~ 40% of the sites accessed over Tor have a torproject.org domain name". At the time it was a mystery why.
Context part two: pastly or teor or somebody in Mexico City realized that Orbot had a design mistake where it did an onionoo lookup (over Tor) of the exit relay for its circuit, rather than shipping its own geoip db.
Context part two-b: They also discovered that around the time of that feature roll-out in Orbot, our onionperf graphs start to look uglier especially in terms of performance variance.
Context part three: I think Nathan thinks he fixed the issue in the "Orbot 16.0.3-BETA-2" release on Oct 12. I remember we tracked down what we thought was the fix to a commit that had an unrelated commit message.
Today I saw another Orbot release mail, for "Orbot 16.0.5-RC-1-tor-0.3.4.9".
So: is there a graph or stats somewhere about adoption of Orbot versions, to get a handle on how many Orbot users have this fixed version vs how many don't?
And, can we see any changes on the onionperf results as the fix got rolled out?
And, once we think the fix has been rolled out to most Orbot users, could we do another privcount run on some exits to see if the anomaly went away?