September 2014 - August 2017
Some topics we might work on
Hidden service research and development work TBD, but hopefully including:
- Improve the Tor client software to more reliably reach hidden services to allow more scalable and accurate crawling -- I want to get us to the point where we can hit a Tor client with 100 hidden service socks requests at once and it will handle the reachable ones well and only fail on the ones that are actually unreachable. I'm thinking a good way to get there is to follow the "spin up a local Tor network and do performance and consistency tests" plans (ties in with the upcoming SponsorS work on Tor network testing), and then find and fix HS bugs until everything is reliable.
1b) Better feedback by the Tor client to the controller and/or socks connection about what step went wrong in reaching the hidden service, so we can know whether it's down or just something else went wrong (and if so what).
Design and build a hidden-service "health monitoring" service to observe the availability of a hidden service -- something that hits the hidden service periodically, and gathers statistics about consistency, speed, where things fail, etc, and then visualizes the data for the world.
Instrument Tor relays to report (perhaps in their extrainfo descs) global HS summary statistics in a way that maintains privacy for both users and services. The hard part here will be figuring out which statistics we want to capture, and convincing ourselves that it's safe and worthwhile to do so.
Extend the metrics portal: make the above sanitized data available to the world for research, and visualize and track parts of it for them.
Consider the impact of Tor's existing (external) project to redesign hidden services, and adapt our approaches to safely collect aggregate statistics in a sustainable and ongoing way. There's a fine distinction here -- this is not general funding for redesigning hidden services, but it does cover a) design modifications to improve performance or reliability of reaching a hidden service, and b) analyzing our planned redesign to see if it introduces any scary new issues or flaws.
Become the expert on all the places on the Internet to discover new .onion addresses (tor2web, ahmia, irc networks, global dns server traffic, twitter feeds, web crawler output, ...)
Year 1 - September 2014 to September 2015
Year 2 - September 2015 to September 2016
Notes and task for 
Notes from the mailing list
There was a thread about the SponsorR project in the [tor-dev] mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007642.html
- Meeting logs are archived by MeetBot: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-dev/