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Initial stab at a huge tasklist for the SponsorR project.
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The tasks were picked from the [tor-dev] thread:
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https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007642.html
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For now these are just all the ideas that were expressed. Not the actual tasklist.
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1. Safe statistics collection
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* More research on obfuscation techniques for collecting statistics
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* Collect additional statistics after security analysis.
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* Create Privex-like statistics collection system
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* Write tech report about all HS statistics and figure out which ones to do **[HALF DONE]**
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2. Tor controller API improvements
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* Torperf HS benchmarking (#1944)
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* HS integration tests (e.g. #13494)
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- improve HS privnets (#13401)
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* Expose better HS error messages to users/benchmarking (#13212, prop292)
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* Setup HS using the control port (#1949, #5976)
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* Edit the authorized clients list of HSes using control port
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- client-side: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8000 / https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007735.html
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* Improve control port interface of HSes
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- "change configuration command" meejah: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007693.html
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3. Performance improvements
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* Improve HS circuit establishment performance
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- #8239 Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old intro points
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- #3733 Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time out
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- #13222: Clients accessing a hidden service can establish their rend point in parallel to fetching the hsdesc
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- #13239: Maybe we want three preemptive internal circs for hidden services?
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- Can we make unsuccessful rendezvous connections less of a burden on the network?
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* Gather stats and benchmarks from privnets (#13792, #13208, #13209) **[IN PROGRESS]**
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* Profile/benchmark busy HSes to find chokepoints (see #8902)
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* Document best practices for crawlers so that they are fast and don't fuck the network
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* Further develop tor2web mode.
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* Examine magic numbers and constants of HSes, document them and improve them (tech report)
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- #8950 (number of IPs), number of HSDirs, etc.
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* ed25519/crypto performance improvements (are HSes CPU bound?)
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- batch verification
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- more ed25519 tasks: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12498#comment:8
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* Scaling HSes: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007797.html
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4. Opt-in HS indexing service
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* ahmia.fi / HS auth / GNS / petnames / namecoin
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- petname system for gnunet: https://gnunet.org/fcfs/Zoneinfo
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- SDSI: http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/sdsi10.html
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5. Better understanding of HSes (new category)
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* CA certificates for onion domains (https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007786.html)
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* Encrypted services (https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/ideas/xxx-encrypted-services.txt)
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* Enumerate use cases of HSes // Find use cases that are not covered (tech report)
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- Onioncat? Bitcoin? Onionshare? Pond? Video?
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* Stormy
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* Write article on how to setup and secure HSes
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6. sources
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* george's email: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007642.html
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* Roger's email : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007652.html
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* Nick's email : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007645.html
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* John Brooks: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007644.html
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* meejah : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007693.html
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* griffin : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007653.html
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* paul syverson : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007660.html
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* christopher baines: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007797.html |