Describe the limitations of using a bridge to hide that you are using Tor
In tpo/applications/tor-browser#42605 we've been having a discussion about how we should present the functionality of bridges. In particular, how a user may want to use them as a means of hiding from a censor or attacker that they are using the Tor Network, rather than simply a means of accessing the network.
@morgan gave a good summary in tpo/applications/tor-browser#42605 (comment 3137487) about why we shouldn't give the impression that bridges should be used to hide your Tor usage.
I noticed in our own manual for bridges we have a line that says
Using bridges in combination with pluggable transports helps to conceal the fact that you are using Tor, but may slow down the connection compared to using ordinary Tor relays.
I think the original intent of the word "conceal" here is referring to the means of bypassing a firewall rule, but I think users could interpret this as a means of hiding their usage from a censor or attacker.
Maybe this section should flesh out the limitations of using a bridge to hide your Tor usage. E.g. someone could still infer you are using Tor with some traffic analysis. But I'm not an expert on this kind of thing myself.