support issueshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues2023-11-13T06:42:49Zhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/332tbb-firewall-ports link from "the firewalled-clients FAQ entry" is out of date2023-11-13T06:42:49ZEliastbb-firewall-ports link from "the firewalled-clients FAQ entry" is out of dateFAQ pages > I'm behind a NAT/Firewall > the firewalled-clients FAQ entry: https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-firewall-ports/
The first suggestion, to visit portforward.com is bad. Portforward simply wants to sell janky software. ...FAQ pages > I'm behind a NAT/Firewall > the firewalled-clients FAQ entry: https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-firewall-ports/
The first suggestion, to visit portforward.com is bad. Portforward simply wants to sell janky software. Their trial version is not helpful; their site does little to help someone with complicated firewall issues.
The second suggestion is out of date: Adding "FascistFirewall 1" or "ReachableOR Addresses/ReachableDir Addresses" to torrc produces error messages and blocks startup.
Error message example:
Nov 08 03:50:33 DietPi tor[4265]: Nov 08 03:50:33.820 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Nov 08 03:50:33 DietPi tor[4265]: Nov 08 03:50:33.823 [warn] The ReachableDirAddresses option is deprecated, and will most likely be removed in a future version of Tor. It has no effect on relays, and has had no effect on clients since 0.2.8. (If you think this is a mistake, please let us know!)
Nov 08 03:50:33 DietPi tor[4265]: Nov 08 03:50:33.824 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Servers must be able to freely connect to the rest of the Internet, so they must not set Reachable*Addresses or FascistFirewall or FirewallPorts or ClientUseIPv4 0.
The firewalled FAQ web page is pretty useless at this point. Should be updated.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/322Update FAQ entry "Are there any paid versions of Tor Browser?"2023-06-23T14:57:09Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgUpdate FAQ entry "Are there any paid versions of Tor Browser?"A lot of users have been reporting to the donations@/giving@ queues for refunds towards fraudulent and fake Tor apps downloaded from the app stores. As suggested in https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40108#note_...A lot of users have been reporting to the donations@/giving@ queues for refunds towards fraudulent and fake Tor apps downloaded from the app stores. As suggested in https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40108#note_2876211, let's add a line about this.championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/296Discourage VPN usage when running a snowflake proxy2024-02-27T13:16:51ZGusDiscourage VPN usage when running a snowflake proxyFeedback from the [Tor forum](https://forum.torproject.net/t/discourage-vpn-usage-when-running-a-snowflake-proxy/2408):
"For instance just a simple sentence like “Due to censorship of VPN servers in some countries, we kindly ask you to...Feedback from the [Tor forum](https://forum.torproject.net/t/discourage-vpn-usage-when-running-a-snowflake-proxy/2408):
"For instance just a simple sentence like “Due to censorship of VPN servers in some countries, we kindly ask you to not run a snowflake proxy while connected to a VPN”."
We could add this sentence here:
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/how-to-help-running-snowflake/Sponsor 96: Rapid Expansion of Access to the Uncensored Internet through Tor in China, Hong Kong, & Tibethttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/292Add a page/FAQ about bad Tor Browsers2022-06-02T20:38:03ZPier Angelo VendrameAdd a page/FAQ about bad Tor BrowsersWe are reviewing Tor Browser docs, and we would like to have this page about [fake Tor Browser](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/wikis/Bad_TorBrowsers) moved to support pages.
We think that users are not like...We are reviewing Tor Browser docs, and we would like to have this page about [fake Tor Browser](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/wikis/Bad_TorBrowsers) moved to support pages.
We think that users are not likely finding it in the TB Wiki.
I think it would be worth telling also that Chrome extensions that route traffic through Tor are not as good as Tor Browser because they do not help in decreasing fingerprinting.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/287[Censorship] Point to the 'snowflake' tag (on Tor forum) in the entry 'What i...2022-04-25T17:49:28Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Censorship] Point to the 'snowflake' tag (on Tor forum) in the entry 'What is Snowflake'Since we have some quality posts on the forum now, we are experimenting sorting articles on the forum with specific [tags](https://meta.discourse.org/t/a-comprehensive-guide-to-discourse-tags/121041). We have now created one for '[snowfl...Since we have some quality posts on the forum now, we are experimenting sorting articles on the forum with specific [tags](https://meta.discourse.org/t/a-comprehensive-guide-to-discourse-tags/121041). We have now created one for '[snowflake](https://forum.torproject.net/tag/snowflake
)' and I believe we can point users to that from the Support FAQGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/286Add David's key2022-02-22T13:23:52ZbmwiedemannAdd David's keydistribution packagers need to know who is authorized to sign tarballs
because tor is quite important software to users.
With the release of 0.4.6.10, the signing changed, so please update gpg fingerprints on support.torproject.orgdistribution packagers need to know who is authorized to sign tarballs
because tor is quite important software to users.
With the release of 0.4.6.10, the signing changed, so please update gpg fingerprints on support.torproject.orgGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/281Add the telegram bot instructions on "How to circumvent the Great Firewall an...2022-03-17T12:24:33ZGusAdd the telegram bot instructions on "How to circumvent the Great Firewall and connect to Tor from China?"As the new Telegram bot (@GetBridgesBot) seems a great success, we should add instructions on the support entry for Chinese users:
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/As the new Telegram bot (@GetBridgesBot) seems a great success, we should add instructions on the support entry for Chinese users:
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/Sponsor 96: Rapid Expansion of Access to the Uncensored Internet through Tor in China, Hong Kong, & TibetGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/252bandwidth-shaping script link Path not found2022-06-14T15:01:36Zcypherpunksbandwidth-shaping script link Path not foundon page:
https://support.torproject.org/operators/bandwidth-shaping/
The link from last script, leads to nowhere.
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh
Path not foundon page:
https://support.torproject.org/operators/bandwidth-shaping/
The link from last script, leads to nowhere.
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh
Path not foundhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/265[Relay Operators] What's MetricsPort and how to enable it2022-04-05T17:50:20ZGus[Relay Operators] What's MetricsPort and how to enable itAs MetricsPort is a new Tor feature, we should add a new entry explaining what's it, how operators can enable it, and what precautions they should take.
We should not copy and paste little-t-tor docs, but point it as a reference.
...As MetricsPort is a new Tor feature, we should add a new entry explaining what's it, how operators can enable it, and what precautions they should take.
We should not copy and paste little-t-tor docs, but point it as a reference.
MetricsPort [address:]port [format]
WARNING: Before enabling this, it is important to understand that exposing tor metrics publicly is dangerous to the Tor network users. Please take extra precaution and care when opening this
port. Set a very strict access policy with MetricsPortPolicy and consider using your operating systems firewall features for defense in depth.
We recommend, for the prometheus format, that the only address that can access this port should be the Prometheus server itself. Remember that the connection is unencrypted (HTTP) hence consider
using a tool like stunnel to secure the link from this port to the server.
If set, open this port to listen for an HTTP GET request to "/metrics". Upon a request, the collected metrics in the the tor instance are formatted for the given format and then sent back. If
this is set, MetricsPortPolicy must be defined else every request will be rejected.
Supported format is "prometheus" which is also the default if not set. The Prometheus data model can be found here: https://prometheus.io/docs/concepts/data_model/
The tor metrics are constantly collected and they solely consists of counters. Thus, asking for those metrics is very lightweight on the tor process. (Default: None)
As an example, here only 5.6.7.8 will be allowed to connect:
MetricsPort 1.2.3.4:9035
MetricsPortPolicy accept 5.6.7.8
MetricsPortPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an entrance policy for the MetricsPort, to limit who can access it. The policies have the same form as exit policies below, except that port specifiers are ignored. For multiple entries,
this line can be used multiple times. It is a reject all by default policy. (Default: None)
Please, keep in mind here that if the server collecting metrics on the MetricsPort is behind a NAT, then everything behind it can access it. This is similar for the case of allowing localhost,
every users on the server will be able to access it. Again, strongly consider using a tool like stunnel to secure the link or to strengthen access control.Georg KoppenGeorg Koppenhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/212Add a short FAQ to snowflake.tp.o2024-01-10T23:43:36ZArlo BreaultAdd a short FAQ to snowflake.tp.oThis should include explanations for the missing feature error messages. See comment:13:ticket:31391This should include explanations for the missing feature error messages. See comment:13:ticket:31391https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/10Add instructions how to verify signatures on Android2021-08-23T16:30:49ZGusAdd instructions how to verify signatures on Androidneeds a section for Android.
migrated from: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27514needs a section for Android.
migrated from: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27514https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/148Bad instructions in Support Portal, "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature...2023-11-12T20:12:24ZTracBad instructions in Support Portal, "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?", discourage, deter, and prevent users on macOS from verifying the Signature of downloaded Tor Browser packagesPlatform: Tor Browser 8.5.5 on macOS Mojave 10.14.6
Users on macOS who rely solely on and adhere to the crucial Support Portal instructions currently appearing in [How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?](https://support.torproject.or...Platform: Tor Browser 8.5.5 on macOS Mojave 10.14.6
Users on macOS who rely solely on and adhere to the crucial Support Portal instructions currently appearing in [How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/) never will be able to use the Tor Browser Developer's signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package.
"How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions contain misinformed, inaccurate, and incomplete instructions for users on macOS needing to use the Tor Developer's Signing key (".asc" file) to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package (".dmg" file).
The crucial "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions for users on Windows and GNU/Linux to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package DO NOT WORK for users on macOS.
The current "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" documentation instructs users on macOS, Windows, and GNU/Linux, to enter a command with `gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring` in the command line, and the command looks something like the following command to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package, but a command with `gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring` in the command line DOES NOT WORK for users on macOS:
`gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring ~/Downloads/TorBrowser-8.5.4-osx64_en-US.dmg{.asc,}`
For users on macOS, the preceding command or other similar command using `gpgv --keyring ./tor.keyring` in the command line returns the following message:
`gpgv: keyblock resource './tor.keyring': No such file or directory`
`gpgv: no valid OpenPGP data found.`
`gpgv: the signature could not be verified.`
`Please remember that the signature file (.sig or .asc)`
`should be the first file given on the command line.`
For users on macOS, attempts to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package by using `gpgv --keyring .\tor.keyring` in the command line will fail.
For users on macOS, the `gpg --verify` command must appear in the command line for verification of the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package to be successful. The example below assumes the user has downloaded the Tor Browser package (".dmg") file and the PGP Signature (".asc") file to the "Downloads" folder.
Users on macOS use the command with the following form, and `gpg --verify` appears in the command line to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package:
`gpg --verify ~/Downloads/TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc /Downloads/TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg`
For users on macOS, the `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc` entry must precede the `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg` entry on the command line; the preceding command successfully verifies the Signature of the downloaded Tor Browser package by returning the following message:
`gpg: Signature made Tue Sep 3 06:07:30 2019 PDT`
`gpg: using RSA key EB774491D9FF06E2`
`gpg: Good signature from "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>"`
"How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions should be edited accordingly and should have the additional instructions below necessary for users on macOS relying solely on "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions to use the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package.
----
In the subsection "Fetching the Tor Developers key" in "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?, the content should present something like the following instructions for the benefit of all users on macOS:
The Tor Browser team signs Tor Browser releases.
Import the Tor Browser Developers signing key (0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290):
`gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.org`
After importing the Tor Browser Developers signing key, users can take the additional step of saving it to a file by entering the following command:
`gpg --output ./tor.keyring --export 0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290`
On macOS, by default, the preceding export command saves the Tor Browser Developers key in the following file:
`~/Users/<user name>/tor.keyring`
----
For users on macOS, the subsection "Verifying the signature" in "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" contains misinformed and incomplete instructions. These instructions should be edited for the benefit of users on macOS and should include the additional instructions below, crucial for users on macOS relying solely on "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions to use the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package.
The "Verifying the signature" subsection presently contains the following information, which confusingly applies the information to users on Windows, GNU/Linux, and macOS, but in reality the information does not apply accurately to users on macOS:
Each file on our download page is accompanied by a file with the same name as the package and the extension ".asc"
The preceding inaccurate information causes confusion for users on macOS and acts as a deterrent and a stumbling block for users on macOS, thereby discouraging, thwarting, or preventing users on macOS from using the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package.
In the subsection "Verifying the signature?" in "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?", something that looks like the following content justifiably merits inclusion in the instructions so that users on macOS relying solely on "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" instructions can receive the crucial benefit of using the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package:
After a macOS user downloads the Tor Browser package (".dmg" file), the user downloads the Signature file corresponding with the downloaded Tor Browser installer package.
For users on macOS, on the Tor Browser [Download page](https://www.torproject.org/download/), clicking on the "Sig" or "(sig)" link that corresponds with the downloaded Tor Browser package will open an additional tab in the Tor Browser window, and the window content will include only a block of text, which is the PGP Signature itself.
Users on macOS must save the block of text (the PGP Signature) as an ".asc" file.
In the Tor Browser menu bar, users on macOS select "File > Save Page As", which will open a Finder-save window.
In the Finder-save window, a file name that looks something like `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc`, will self-populate in the space bar on the right side of "Save As:".
If the name of the self-populated file looks something like `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg`, the user must type ".asc" file extension at the end of the file name to make it look something like `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc`.
In the Finder-save window, the user selects a folder to save the Signature (".asc") file and saves it in the same folder where the downloaded Tor Browser package (".dmg") file was saved, e.g., in the "Desktop" folder or the "Downloads" folder.
The user customarily always should save the PGP Signature (".asc") file in the same folder where the user saved the downloaded Tor Browser package (".dmg" file).
The downloaded Tor Browser package itself will have a file name that looks something like `TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg`.
----
The important content below justifiably merits inclusion in the instructions in the "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" section for users on macOS to use the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package.
For users on macOS who have installed GPGTools and have imported the Tor Browser Developers key into GPG Keychain, the following instructions allow users to verify the Signature of each downloaded Tor Browser package quickly without having to use terminal commands each time the user downloads a fresh updated or upgraded Tor Browser package (".dmg file) and its corresponding Signature ("Sig") file:
When the downloaded Tor Browser package (".dmg") file and its corresponding Signature (".asc") file are saved in the same folder, users on macOS can double-click on the ".asc" file to open the "Verification Results" window. A successful verification will display in the "Verification Results" window a message that looks something like the following:
`TorBrowser-8.5.5-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc Signed by: Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org> (1107 75B5 D101 FB36 BC6C 911B EB77 4491 D9FF 06E2) - Ultimate trust`
The term "Ultimate trust" will appear at the end of the preceding message only if the user on macOS has assigned "Ownertrust: Ultimate" in GPG Keychain > pub...Tor Browser Developers...4E2C 6E87 9329 8290 > Key Details > Key.
Before assigning "Ultimate trust", it is crucial for users on macOS to confirm that the Key Fingerprint and Subkey Fingerprint appearing in the GPG Keychain window match the corresponding Key Fingerprint and Subkey Fingerprint appearing in the official Tor Project [list of signing keys](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en).
----
After the "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature? instructions are edited as described, users on macOS who rely solely on "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" documentation will be able to use the Tor Developer's Signing key to verify the Signature of a downloaded Tor Browser package, thereby reducing the chances of users on macOS unknowingly or unwittingly installing Tor Browser packages that might contain corrupted files and/or malware.
Shouldn't we make it both possible and easier for all users, including users on macOS, to verify Tor Browser's signature?
In the "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" section, can we edit the instructions as described so users on macOS relying solely on "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" documentation can use the Tor Browser Developer's signing key to verify the Signature each time a user on macOS downloads a fresh Tor Browser package.
[#31296 reopened defect](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31296)
[#31254 closed defect (fixed)](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31254)
**Trac**:
**Username**: monmireebanamebanam@torproject.orgebanamebanam@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/250Add to Support portal the new forum link and other references2021-10-27T16:10:43ZGabagaba@torproject.orgAdd to Support portal the new forum link and other referencesUpdate portals with links to the new forum.Update portals with links to the new forum.Launch support's Forum and Blog migrationGusGus2021-10-30https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/57Create new question - When I start Tor Browser I get an error message: "Canno...2022-02-08T14:49:33ZGusCreate new question - When I start Tor Browser I get an error message: "Cannot load XPCOM"https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#XPCOMErrorhttps://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#XPCOMErrorhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/68Adding more glossary terms2020-11-18T15:37:20Zc1e0Adding more glossary termsI've been thinking of adding more terms into the glossary. I want to make sure the team thinks the suggested terms are relevant:
* host
* bug
* Trac
* SSL
* backdoor
* Onion routing
* VPN
* spyware
* XMPP
* fingerprint
* BitTorrent
* mal...I've been thinking of adding more terms into the glossary. I want to make sure the team thinks the suggested terms are relevant:
* host
* bug
* Trac
* SSL
* backdoor
* Onion routing
* VPN
* spyware
* XMPP
* fingerprint
* BitTorrent
* malware
* GnuPG
* TCP
* Hamburger Menu
Is there anything anyone wants me to add or remove?GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/70Add new question about Snowflake2021-08-23T16:30:12ZGusAdd new question about SnowflakeIn Censorship section, add new question about our new pluggable transport Snowflake:
- [x] What is Snowflake
- [x] How it works (briefly) and benefits
- [x] Platforms supported (Windows, macOS, Linux; Android is a working in progress)
-...In Censorship section, add new question about our new pluggable transport Snowflake:
- [x] What is Snowflake
- [x] How it works (briefly) and benefits
- [x] Platforms supported (Windows, macOS, Linux; Android is a working in progress)
- [x] How you can use it with Tor Browser Alpha
- [x] How to run snowflakes proxies to help other users
- [x] Say it's under development
Resources:
- https://snowflake.torproject.org/
- https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflakechampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/72Create new question - Proxy server refusing connections2021-01-22T02:07:07Zc1e0Create new question - Proxy server refusing connectionsI noticed that there were a lot of cases online where people faced issues with the proxy server. Do you think this question should be added to the faqs?I noticed that there were a lot of cases online where people faced issues with the proxy server. Do you think this question should be added to the faqs?GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/73Add missing link to firewalled-clients FAQ in behind-nat question2021-10-21T13:27:32ZemmapeelAdd missing link to firewalled-clients FAQ in behind-nat questionin https://support.torproject.org/operators/behind-nat/ we suggest to read the 'firewalled-clients FAQ' but we don't provide any way to find that FAQ.
We should find out where it is, and link it on the text:
> If your relay is running ...in https://support.torproject.org/operators/behind-nat/ we suggest to read the 'firewalled-clients FAQ' but we don't provide any way to find that FAQ.
We should find out where it is, and link it on the text:
> If your relay is running on a internal net you need to setup port forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but the firewalled-clients FAQ entry offers some examples on how to do this.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/75Update questions and glossary items that refer to onion icon or torbutton2021-02-18T17:54:16ZMona GhassemiUpdate questions and glossary items that refer to onion icon or torbuttonThere is no longer an onion icon in TBB release 9 and the term torbutton appears to be even older.
The following items still need to be updated:
* [ ] -How do I view Tor Browser message log?
Also:
* [ ] "-I am having trouble connec...There is no longer an onion icon in TBB release 9 and the term torbutton appears to be even older.
The following items still need to be updated:
* [ ] -How do I view Tor Browser message log?
Also:
* [ ] "-I am having trouble connecting to Tor, and I can’t figure out what’s wrong."
(not clear 'please select the option to "copy Tor log to clipboard."') It used to be in the torbutton but...
Glossary items:
* [ ] "NoScript
Tor Browser includes an add-on called NoScript, accessed through the “S” icon at the top-left of the window, which allows you to control the JavaScriptthat runs on individual web pages, or to block it entirely."
(there is no S icon)
* [ ] "Tor log
"Tor log" is an automatically-generated list of Tor’s activity that can help diagnose problems. When something goes wrong with Tor, you may see an option with the error message to "copy Tor log to clipboard". If you don't see this option and you have Tor Browser open, you can navigate to the Torbutton (on the top left of the browser, to the left of the URL bar). Click the Tor button, then open Tor Network Settings. You should see an option at the bottom to copy the log to your clipboard, which you can then paste to a document to show whoever is helping you troubleshoot."
(refers to Torbutton)
* [ ] Torbutton
A button marked by a little gray onion to the right of the URL bar. Its menu offers you "New Identity", "Tor Network Settings..." and "Check for Tor Browser Update..." options.
(remove or mark as historical?)GusGus2019-10-22https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/77Organise Tor Browser section in a more meaningful way2020-10-16T19:38:02ZGusOrganise Tor Browser section in a more meaningful wayFor each question in [Tor Browser section](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/), you will need to add a new value, for example:
```
key: 1
```
So you need to read all questions, figure out the best order from user perspective, edit the...For each question in [Tor Browser section](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/), you will need to add a new value, for example:
```
key: 1
```
So you need to read all questions, figure out the best order from user perspective, edit the file and add key: number. See another example [here](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torproject/support/master/content/about/backdoor/contents.lr).
And https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ should be **key: 1** . :smirk_cat:https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/81[Windows] Improve documentation for compiling local site via Lektor2021-08-23T16:30:13ZMac Tavish[Windows] Improve documentation for compiling local site via LektorMany users can't compile the local site because of lektor errors. Please review the instructions and add the errors (reported by users) and their solutions in troubleshooting section.
If you have any errors, please report them so we can...Many users can't compile the local site because of lektor errors. Please review the instructions and add the errors (reported by users) and their solutions in troubleshooting section.
If you have any errors, please report them so we can document them. Be sure to mention your platform as well.
I have attached a file, please review it and include its content in the instructions
[Local_site_compilation_instruction_draft.txt](/uploads/b97f9042f3fc6d0c6a77a455c5cf10f6/Local_site_compilation_instruction_draft.txt)
**Disclaimer:** *Written by a Windows User, there might be some difference depending upon your platform.*
**Edit:** **I have updated the attachment file.**https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/178Support Portal: How to Access an Onion Service2023-11-13T05:06:00ZSehrish AslamSupport Portal: How to Access an Onion ServiceNote: Came across a user asking for help on Reddit on "How to setup .onion website".
On [Support Portal](https://support.torproject.org/) under [Onion Services](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/) two important titles must b...Note: Came across a user asking for help on Reddit on "How to setup .onion website".
On [Support Portal](https://support.torproject.org/) under [Onion Services](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/) two important titles must be added.
1. How To Access an Onion Service with a brief introduction and link to [HOW TO ACCESS AN ONION SERVICE](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/onion-services/)
2. How to Configure Onion Services for Tor with link to [How to Configure Onion Services for Tor](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-onion-service.html.en)
IMHO, in order to make website UX/UI friendly links must be added so users find required information without any trouble. Although there is a separate page under [User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/about/) about [Onion Services](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/onion-services/) but I believe these two must be linked together.
Additionally, [Onion Services](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/) entry in Glossary must also include link to detailed description on [Onion Services](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/onion-services/)
@gus if you approve these suggestion I can work on this.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/94[Tor Browser 9.5][Onion services] Update URL bar onion indicators2021-08-23T16:29:33ZGus[Tor Browser 9.5][Onion services] Update URL bar onion indicatorsIn the next release, Tor Browser 9.5 will change Onion indicators in URL bar, check this ticket for more reference:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32645
We will need to update the [documentation in support portal](http...In the next release, Tor Browser 9.5 will change Onion indicators in URL bar, check this ticket for more reference:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32645
We will need to update the [documentation in support portal](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-5/) - Onion-services-5 - to reflect this change.
This modification is already available in [Tor Browser Alpha](https://www.torproject.org/download/alpha/)https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/98Add Mailing List information2020-11-18T15:29:25ZemmapeelAdd Mailing List informationWe don't have mailing list information, neither on the Contact section of tpo, not in the ['Get in touch'](https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/) section in the support portal.
We should decide a place for it, there is some infor...We don't have mailing list information, neither on the Contact section of tpo, not in the ['Get in touch'](https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/) section in the support portal.
We should decide a place for it, there is some information at
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/documentation#MailingLists
But it should be updated.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/115Update "How to report bug or feedback" and remove Trac2020-08-27T16:32:19ZGusUpdate "How to report bug or feedback" and remove TracSince we're moving from Trac, we will need to update our documentation to explain how to report bug or give feedback.
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/misc/bug-or-feedback/Since we're moving from Trac, we will need to update our documentation to explain how to report bug or give feedback.
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/misc/bug-or-feedback/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/117Remove offensive terminology2020-10-09T15:20:14ZGusRemove offensive terminologyI've found some "whitelist" and "blacklist" in our support docs, and we should replace that with a better terminology. See:
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-knodel-terminology-00.html#rfc.section.1.2I've found some "whitelist" and "blacklist" in our support docs, and we should replace that with a better terminology. See:
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-knodel-terminology-00.html#rfc.section.1.2GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/119Update "How to Report a Bug or Give Feedback" to reflect GitLab migration2020-08-27T16:33:24ZGusUpdate "How to Report a Bug or Give Feedback" to reflect GitLab migrationWe need to update this entry:
> Trac
>
> You can file a ticket at https://trac.torproject.org. We track all Tor Browser 9 related issues with the tbb-9.0-issues keyword. Tickets related to our website should be added with the component...We need to update this entry:
> Trac
>
> You can file a ticket at https://trac.torproject.org. We track all Tor Browser 9 related issues with the tbb-9.0-issues keyword. Tickets related to our website should be added with the component "Webpages/Website."
https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/c1e0c1e0https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/120Incorrect GPGTools link2020-09-18T15:53:54ZGusIncorrect GPGTools linkFrom frontdesk:
Hello! This weblink (https://www.gpgtools.org) leads to a security risk site. I believe it needs to link to this site instead: https://gpgtools.org/From frontdesk:
Hello! This weblink (https://www.gpgtools.org) leads to a security risk site. I believe it needs to link to this site instead: https://gpgtools.org/GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/121Feedback on https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ and s...2020-10-14T03:34:21ZGusFeedback on https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ and suggestions for making it easier to verify tor downloadsFeedback from frontdesk:
Hi, I recently installed tor (thanks so much for this great work). And I have some suggestions for improving the web page instructions to verify downloads. I'm referring to the instructions at https://support.to...Feedback from frontdesk:
Hi, I recently installed tor (thanks so much for this great work). And I have some suggestions for improving the web page instructions to verify downloads. I'm referring to the instructions at https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ and https://www.torproject.org/download/.
1. The download load page (https://www.torproject.org/download/) makes it tricky to understand how to get the signature. The download page on each of the choices has Signature (?). The ? page does take you to the how to verify sig page, but you have to know where to get the .asc file. I'm sure it's not obvious to naive users, it wasn't obvious to me either.
You might improve the UX of this page to somehow tell the users they need to download the appropriate .asc file.
2. On the how to verify page (https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/), it states the .asc file is found where the download was. But it's a little tricky to figure out that what this really means is you go back one page, then click "save link as" on the 'signature'.
2.a Solution number (a) Download that page automatically when the user clicks on it, the .asc page. That's probably the best solution. On firefox it doesn't download. And on chrome it doesn't download either, it just shows that page. I'm left with copying and saving it through some other program, or "save-as" on that page.
2.b Update the text to be more clear.
Current text:
> Each file on our download page is accompanied by a file with the same name as the package and the extension ".asc". These .asc files are OpenPGP signatures. They allow you to verify the file you've downloaded is exactly the one that we intended you to get.
>
> For example, torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe is accompanied by torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc. These are example file names and will not exactly match the file names that you download.
Suggested text. I highlighted my changes
> Each file on our download page is accompanied by a file with the same name as the package and the extension ".asc", **see the 'signature' files**. These .asc files are OpenPGP signatures. They allow you to verify the file you've downloaded is exactly the one that we intended you to get. **One way to get them is to download the 'signature' file. This varies by web browser, but there's usually an option like "download link" where you "right-click" the 'signature' link and save the file.**
>
> For example, torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe is accompanied by torbrowser-install-win64-9.0_en-US.exe.asc. These are example file names and will not exactly match the file names that you download.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/122Update pluggable transports link to tb-manual2020-10-09T14:19:46ZGusUpdate pluggable transports link to tb-manualIn this support entry:
"Several countries, including China and Iran, have found ways to detect and block connections to Tor bridges. Obfsproxy bridges address this by adding another layer of obfuscation. Setting up an obfsproxy bridge re...In this support entry:
"Several countries, including China and Iran, have found ways to detect and block connections to Tor bridges. Obfsproxy bridges address this by adding another layer of obfuscation. Setting up an obfsproxy bridge requires an additional software package and additional configurations. See our page on pluggable transports for more info."
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/censorship-7/
We need to change the link to tb-manual pluggable transports section.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/123Update gpg output on "How to verify Tor Browser signature"2020-10-16T02:38:07ZGusUpdate gpg output on "How to verify Tor Browser signature"
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/
`$ gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.org`
```
gpg: key 4E2C6E8793298290: "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org...
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/
`$ gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys torbrowser@torproject.org`
```
gpg: key 4E2C6E8793298290: "Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>" 2 new signatures
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: new signatures: 2
pub rsa4096 2014-12-15 [C] [expires: 2025-07-21]
EF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290
uid [ unknown] Tor Browser Developers (signing key) <torbrowser@torproject.org>
sub rsa4096 2018-05-26 [S] [expires: 2020-12-19]
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/133Removed space before and after slash (/)2020-11-18T19:40:55ZGoodness ChrisugariRemoved space before and after slash (/)Space before or after a slash should be avoided, they can be used that way when quoting a poem in which case the slash indicates a line break. They should be removed since the slash is used to indicate the word "or" here.Space before or after a slash should be avoided, they can be used that way when quoting a poem in which case the slash indicates a line break. They should be removed since the slash is used to indicate the word "or" here.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/140[Connecting to Tor] Add the command line option to view logs2020-12-28T16:43:02Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Connecting to Tor] Add the command line option to view logsAn user reported on the #tor IRC channel that they couldn't launch the Tor Browser and couldn't obtain the logs either. Currently, we direct users to two ways of getting the Tor logs in the ['Connecting to Tor'](https://support.torprojec...An user reported on the #tor IRC channel that they couldn't launch the Tor Browser and couldn't obtain the logs either. Currently, we direct users to two ways of getting the Tor logs in the ['Connecting to Tor'](https://support.torproject.org/connecting/#connecting-2) support page, i.e. with the option to 'copy Tor log to Clipboard' or to navigate through the hamburger menu within the browser. We should add the option of launching the Tor Browser in terminal with the verbose flag, i.e. `./start-tor-browser.desktop --verbose` to get the logs right in the terminal (this is what helped the user to diagnose the problem in this case).championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/146Update debian repository instructions2021-09-08T15:56:28ZGusUpdate debian repository instructionsFrom Frontdesk:
https://support.torproject.org/apt/#apt-1
As well as the 'deb.torproject.org-keyring' package to use the signing key in a more secure manner. the problem is that "apt-key add -" saves the key to
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/,...From Frontdesk:
https://support.torproject.org/apt/#apt-1
As well as the 'deb.torproject.org-keyring' package to use the signing key in a more secure manner. the problem is that "apt-key add -" saves the key to
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/, and apt tries all the keys stored there to verify signatures of all repos.
third party repos should use /usr/share/keyrings/ for (non-ASCII-armored) keyrings and explicitly pin their repo to their own keyring, e.g.
deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/tor_keyring.gpg] https://...
more on this can be found here:
https://wiki.debian.org/DebianRepository/UseThirdPartyGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/155[Tor Browser] Adding the command line option to view logs2021-02-09T17:40:12Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Tor Browser] Adding the command line option to view logsWith reference to this issue : https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/140, we need add the command line option to view logs under the FAQ - "How do I view Tor Browser message log?"With reference to this issue : https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/140, we need add the command line option to view logs under the FAQ - "How do I view Tor Browser message log?"championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/156Update how to manage bookmarks2021-04-06T09:55:13ZGusUpdate how to manage bookmarksAfter TB 10, these instructions need to be updated:
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/export-and-import-bookmarks/After TB 10, these instructions need to be updated:
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/export-and-import-bookmarks/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/165[Tor Mobile] Review instances of 'Tor'2021-03-02T13:50:17Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Tor Mobile] Review instances of 'Tor'We need to review all instances of 'Tor' in the [Tor Mobile](https://support.torproject.org/tormobile/) section and change them to 'Tor Browser'. We are aware that the faq questions as it is make sense. For instance, when users ask -- "H...We need to review all instances of 'Tor' in the [Tor Mobile](https://support.torproject.org/tormobile/) section and change them to 'Tor Browser'. We are aware that the faq questions as it is make sense. For instance, when users ask -- "How can I use Tor on Android?" they actually mean the 'Tor Browser'. But otherwise, it can get a little confusing.championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/147Tor Browser Developer key is available on keys.openpgp.net2021-03-01T17:28:10ZGusTor Browser Developer key is available on keys.openpgp.netSince the key is now available on keys.openpgp.org:
https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=torbrowser%40torproject.org
We should add this to How to verify signature: https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/Since the key is now available on keys.openpgp.org:
https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=torbrowser%40torproject.org
We should add this to How to verify signature: https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/157Missing dot at the end2021-01-07T14:32:28ZGusMissing dot at the end"You can also access the New Circuit option inside the site information menu in the URL bar, and the New Identity option by
clicking the small sparky broom icon at the top-right of the screen"
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-29/"You can also access the New Circuit option inside the site information menu in the URL bar, and the New Identity option by
clicking the small sparky broom icon at the top-right of the screen"
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-29/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/162Glossary entry seems incomplete2022-07-01T04:42:25Zc1e0Glossary entry seems incompleteThe definition for [onion services](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-services/) says:
> Onion services (formerly known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) that are only accessible through the Tor network. Oni...The definition for [onion services](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-services/) says:
> Onion services (formerly known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) that are only accessible through the Tor network. Onion services offer advantages over ordinary services on the non-private web, including:
I believe there should be more sentences after the "including" word?https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/180[Tor Browser] Add a note that there's currently no good way of exporting/impo...2021-06-29T18:43:57Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Tor Browser] Add a note that there's currently no good way of exporting/importing bookmarks in TBAIn light of the discussion under the tickets: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/156 and https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31617, we must add a short note that there's currently no go...In light of the discussion under the tickets: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/156 and https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31617, we must add a short note that there's currently no good way of exporting/importing bookmarks in Tor Browser for Android under the response to the FAQ -- [How can I export and import bookmarks in Tor Browser?](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/export-and-import-bookmarks/)
We should also acknowledge https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/31617 and point readers to the discussion under that ticket.Sehrish AslamSehrish Aslamhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/235FAQ - more questions to add to the FAQ2021-09-01T17:45:23ZGabagaba@torproject.orgFAQ - more questions to add to the FAQThere were a bunch of questions coming up from the session that Phw did on "Circumventing Internet Censorship with Tor" on June 2020. It would be great to add them to a FAQ with the answers.
Questions from participants:
1. [David F.] ...There were a bunch of questions coming up from the session that Phw did on "Circumventing Internet Censorship with Tor" on June 2020. It would be great to add them to a FAQ with the answers.
Questions from participants:
1. [David F.] There are many search results for "Tor" in app stores. What Tor mobile apps are safe to use?
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/tormobile/
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/tormobile/tormobile-1/
2. [David F.] Where can someone ask questions about Tor and get support?
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/get-in-touch/
3. [anadahz] What happens if an ISP blocks all/some Tor directory authorities? a. As a relay operator: Can I setup a relay on this ISP? b. As a user: Can I connect to Tor (and hope fallback dirs will work)?
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/116
4. [federico] How does Salmon identifies users? If a censor uses dynamic IP addresses to fetch bridges, will future users connecting from those addresses be affected?
Salmon is production ready? If so, we can add to support.tpo,
5. [Reethika] Have you found any interesting issues in your usability studies that you can share with us? Do you have special IRC channels to brainstorm solutions for these usability issues?
https://community.torproject.org/user-research/
=> We are resuming our open meetings next Tuesday in IRC! the details are here https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/ux/team/-/wikis/home [antonela]
6. [anadahz] How can one help Tor network grow and became more diverse?
7. [Oliver L] Are Tor Onionservices already safe against DDoS attacks. I know there have been some fixes in the last year. I hope the question has not yet been answered in the presentation, unfortunately I came a little late ;-)
8. [Arturo] How can the internet measurement community (OONI, RIPE, M-Lab, ICLab, etc.) support your work? Are there any gaps we can help meet?
9. [David F.] What is involved in creating a new pluggable transport?
#dev portal?
10. [Arturo] What are the challenges that come with making tools like Tor work in places that have advanced internet censorship? Meek works in China, but it's expensive. What is the real big challenge?
11. [Jack Wampler] Would a larger number of bridges help to fight bridge enumeration and scraping from bridge db or is the challenge in distribution itself (i.e. deploying salmon)?GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/205Update Snowflake status: Tor Browser Alpha -> Stable2021-07-20T20:37:03ZGusUpdate Snowflake status: Tor Browser Alpha -> StableSnowflake will be released in Tor Browser 10.5 (stable).
For TB 10.5 release, the user support entry needs to be updated:
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/how-can-i-use-snowflake/Snowflake will be released in Tor Browser 10.5 (stable).
For TB 10.5 release, the user support entry needs to be updated:
https://support.torproject.org/censorship/how-can-i-use-snowflake/Tor Browser: 10.5GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/206Tor Browser launcher removal2021-07-14T12:16:00ZGusTor Browser launcher removalAs TB 10.5 will remove the Tor Browser launcher, we need to find all the occurrences in the documentation and update it.
This ticket will track all the changes that need to happen in Support docs.As TB 10.5 will remove the Tor Browser launcher, we need to find all the occurrences in the documentation and update it.
This ticket will track all the changes that need to happen in Support docs.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/208Update Debian repository onion to v32021-06-03T17:19:04ZGusUpdate Debian repository onion to v3In the Support entry "[Can I use APT over Tor?](http://rzuwtpc4wb3xdzrj3yeajsvm3fkq4vbeubm2tdxaqruzzzgs5dwemlad.onion/apt/apt-over-tor/)", there are instructions to use the v2 onion service of deb.torproject.org. Although it's still vali...In the Support entry "[Can I use APT over Tor?](http://rzuwtpc4wb3xdzrj3yeajsvm3fkq4vbeubm2tdxaqruzzzgs5dwemlad.onion/apt/apt-over-tor/)", there are instructions to use the v2 onion service of deb.torproject.org. Although it's still valid, we should promote the new v3 onion service, which is now available. According to [onion.torproject.org](http://xao2lxsmia2edq2n5zxg6uahx6xox2t7bfjw6b5vdzsxi7ezmqob6qid.onion/index.html), the new v3 onion is:
deb.torproject.org
http://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/
http://apow7mjfryruh65chtdydfmqfpj5btws7nbocgtaovhvezgccyjazpqd.onion/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/258Explain what the various Android download options mean2023-04-03T20:40:24Zkulsoom.zahrakulsoomzahra24@gmail.comExplain what the various Android download options meanTor should be easy to use for all. The various download options available for Android (such as _aarch64, arm_ etc) don't make any sense to layman.
![tor](/uploads/eabebcbf1b0fcfa4b8e0608caee9ee2b/tor.png)Tor should be easy to use for all. The various download options available for Android (such as _aarch64, arm_ etc) don't make any sense to layman.
![tor](/uploads/eabebcbf1b0fcfa4b8e0608caee9ee2b/tor.png)donutsdonutshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/210Add a new support item about using Tor in China2021-09-11T08:25:03ZGusAdd a new support item about using Tor in ChinaIn China, users need to use an unlisted private obfs4 bridge, snowflake, or meek-azure.
Many of them are using meek-azure because it says "works in china".
I think it's important to have some specific instructions on using Tor in China ...In China, users need to use an unlisted private obfs4 bridge, snowflake, or meek-azure.
Many of them are using meek-azure because it says "works in china".
I think it's important to have some specific instructions on using Tor in China and how they can get or run their own private unlisted obfs4 bridge.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/213Create new question "How do I run a relay in Windows"2021-08-24T22:38:38ZGusCreate new question "How do I run a relay in Windows"We have instructions how to run relays and bridges on Windows, we should point them to:
You should only run a Windows relay if you can run it 24/7.
If the operator is unable to guarantee that, a [Snowflake](https://support.torproject.o...We have instructions how to run relays and bridges on Windows, we should point them to:
You should only run a Windows relay if you can run it 24/7.
If the operator is unable to guarantee that, a [Snowflake](https://support.torproject.org/censorship/what-is-snowflake/) is a better way to contribute resources.
- https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/guard/windows/
- https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/windows/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/214Add "Can I donate for a relay rather than run my own?"2022-03-30T23:48:00ZGusAdd "Can I donate for a relay rather than run my own?"Update and merge this question: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayDonations
There is a Relay Associations page that we must include:
https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/relay-associations/Update and merge this question: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayDonations
There is a Relay Associations page that we must include:
https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/relay-associations/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/215Add "My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports."2022-03-30T23:48:03ZGusAdd "My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports."If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only use the ports when you start your Tor Browser. Or you can add the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" to your torrc configuration file. By...If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only use the ports when you start your Tor Browser. Or you can add the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" to your torrc configuration file. By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
ReachableDirAddresses *:80
ReachableORAddresses *:443
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#FirewallPortshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/216Add "Is there a list of default exit ports?" to operators section2023-11-09T23:50:53ZGusAdd "Is there a list of default exit ports?" to operators sectionUpdate this answer:
```
The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or modifying the source code. The default according to src/or/policie...Update this answer:
```
The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or modifying the source code. The default according to src/or/policies.c from the source code release tor-0.2.4.16-rc:
reject 0.0.0.0/8
reject 169.254.0.0/16
reject 127.0.0.0/8
reject 192.168.0.0/16
reject 10.0.0.0/8
reject 172.16.0.0/12
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
A relay will block access to its own IP address, as well local network IP addresses. A relay always blocks itself by default. This prevents Tor users from accidentally accessing any of the exit operator's local services.
```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/217Add "How do I check if my application that uses SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?"2022-03-30T23:48:19ZGusAdd "How do I check if my application that uses SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?"This question is about little-t-tor and torsocks:
````
These are two steps you need to take here. The first is to make sure that it's using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, and the second is to make sure that there aren't othe...This question is about little-t-tor and torsocks:
````
These are two steps you need to take here. The first is to make sure that it's using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, and the second is to make sure that there aren't other leaks.
Step one: add "TestSocks 1" to your torrc file, and then watch your logs as you use your application. Tor will then log, for each SOCKS connection, whether it was using a 'good' variant or a 'bad' one. (If you want to automatically disable all 'bad' variants, set "SafeSocks 1" in your torrc file.)
Step two: even if your application is using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, there is still a risk that it could be leaking DNS queries. This problem happens in Firefox extensions that resolve the destination hostname themselves, for example to show you its IP address, what country it's in, etc. These applications may use a safe SOCKS variant when actually making connections, but they still do DNS resolves locally. If you suspect your application might behave like this, you should use a network sniffer like Wireshark and look for suspicious outbound DNS requests. I'm afraid the details of how to look for these problems are beyond the scope of a FAQ entry though -- find a friend to help if you have problems.
````
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#SocksAndDNShttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/218Add "I want to run my Tor client on a different computer than my applications."2022-03-30T23:48:10ZGusAdd "I want to run my Tor client on a different computer than my applications."By default, your Tor client only listens for applications that connect from localhost. Connections from other computers are refused. If you want to torify applications on different computers than the Tor client, you should edit your torr...By default, your Tor client only listens for applications that connect from localhost. Connections from other computers are refused. If you want to torify applications on different computers than the Tor client, you should edit your torrc to define SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0 and then restart (or hup) Tor. If you want to get more advanced, you can configure your Tor client on a firewall to bind to your internal IP but not your external IP.
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplicationshttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/219Add "Can I install Tor on a central server, and have my clients connect to it?"2022-03-30T23:48:05ZGusAdd "Can I install Tor on a central server, and have my clients connect to it?"
Yes. Tor can be configured as a client or a relay on another machine, and allow other machines to be able to connect to it for anonymity. This is most useful in an environment where many computers want a gateway of anonymity to the rest...
Yes. Tor can be configured as a client or a relay on another machine, and allow other machines to be able to connect to it for anonymity. This is most useful in an environment where many computers want a gateway of anonymity to the rest of the world. However, be forewarned that with this configuration, anyone within your private network (existing between you and the Tor client/relay) can see what traffic you are sending in clear text. The anonymity doesn't start until you get to the Tor relay. Because of this, if you are the controller of your domain and you know everything's locked down, you will be OK, but this configuration may not be suitable for large private networks where security is key all around.
Configuration is simple, editing your torrc file's SocksListenAddress according to the following examples:
SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1
SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100
SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9100
You can state multiple listen addresses, in the case that you are part of several networks or subnets.
SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100 #eth0
SocksListenAddress 10.x.x.x:9100 #eth1
After this, your clients on their respective networks/subnets would specify a socks proxy with the address and port you specified SocksListenAddress to be.
Please note that the SocksPort configuration option gives the port ONLY for localhost (127.0.0.1). When setting up your SocksListenAddress(es), you need to give the port with the address, as shown above.
If you are interested in forcing all outgoing data through the central Tor client/relay, instead of the server only being an optional proxy, you may find the program iptables (for *nix) useful.
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ServerClienthttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/220Add "What protections does Tor provide?"2022-03-30T23:48:16ZGusAdd "What protections does Tor provide?"
Internet communication is based on a store-and-forward model that can be understood in analogy to postal mail: Data is transmitted in blocks called IP datagrams or packets. Every packet includes a source IP address (of the sender) and a...
Internet communication is based on a store-and-forward model that can be understood in analogy to postal mail: Data is transmitted in blocks called IP datagrams or packets. Every packet includes a source IP address (of the sender) and a destination IP address (of the receiver), just as ordinary letters contain postal addresses of sender and receiver. The way from sender to receiver involves multiple hops of routers, where each router inspects the destination IP address and forwards the packet closer to its destination. Thus, every router between sender and receiver learns that the sender is communicating with the receiver. In particular, your local ISP is in the position to build a complete profile of your Internet usage. In addition, every server in the Internet that can see any of the packets can profile your behavior.
The aim of Tor is to improve your privacy by sending your traffic through a series of proxies. Your communication is encrypted in multiple layers and routed via multiple hops through the Tor network to the final receiver. More details on this process can be found in the Tor overview. Note that all your local ISP can observe now is that you are communicating with Tor nodes. Similarly, servers in the Internet just see that they are being contacted by Tor nodes.
Generally speaking, Tor aims to solve three privacy problems:
First, Tor prevents websites and other services from learning your location, which they can use to build databases about your habits and interests. With Tor, your Internet connections don't give you away by default -- now you can have the ability to choose, for each connection, how much information to reveal.
Second, Tor prevents people watching your traffic locally (such as your ISP or someone with access to your home wifi or router) from learning what information you're fetching and where you're fetching it from. It also stops them from deciding what you're allowed to learn and publish -- if you can get to any part of the Tor network, you can reach any site on the Internet.
Third, Tor routes your connection through more than one Tor relay so no single relay can learn what you're up to. Because these relays are run by different individuals or organizations, distributing trust provides more security than the old one hop proxy approach.
Note, however, that there are situations where Tor fails to solve these privacy problems entirely: see the entry below on remaining attacks.
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvidehttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/221Add "Tell me about all the keys Tor uses."2022-03-30T23:48:29ZGusAdd "Tell me about all the keys Tor uses."https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#KeyManagement
Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1) encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2) authentication so clients know they're tal...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#KeyManagement
Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1) encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2) authentication so clients know they're talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make sure all clients know the same set of relays.
Encryption: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption, so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption key with each relay in the circuit; these extra layers of encryption mean that only the exit relay can read the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends, so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key won't work.
Authentication: Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key". Each relay rotates its onion key once a week. When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it demands that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key. That way the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path. Because the Tor client chooses the path, it can make sure to get Tor's "distributed trust" property: no single relay in the path can know about both the client and what the client is doing.
Coordination: How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a "directory signing key". The directory authorities provide a signed list of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys, locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8 directory authorities), they can't trick the Tor client into using other Tor relays.
How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with GNU Privacy Guard. See the instructions on how to check Tor's signatures.
In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community and start meeting people.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/222Add "What are Entry Guards?"2022-03-30T23:48:31ZGusAdd "What are Entry Guards?"https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example, suppose the attacker contr...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing information on the two sides.
So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, C relays. Suppose there are N relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around (c/n)2. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker.
The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at random to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, ever, and the user is secure. If those relays are observed or controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger fraction of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled than before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of (n-c)/n) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before.
You can read more at An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols, Defending Anonymous Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks, and especially Locating Hidden Servers.
Restricting your entry nodes may also help against attackers who want to run a few Tor nodes and easily enumerate all of the Tor user IP addresses. (Even though they can't learn what destinations the users are talking to, they still might be able to do bad things with just a list of users.) However, that feature won't really become useful until we move to a "directory guard" design as well.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/223Add "How often does Tor change its paths?"2022-03-30T23:48:27ZGusAdd "How often does Tor change its paths?"https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChangePaths
Tor will reuse the same circuit for new TCP streams for 10 minutes, as long as the circuit is working fine. (If the circuit fails, Tor will switch to a new circuit immediately...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChangePaths
Tor will reuse the same circuit for new TCP streams for 10 minutes, as long as the circuit is working fine. (If the circuit fails, Tor will switch to a new circuit immediately.)
But note that a single TCP stream (e.g. a long IRC connection) will stay on the same circuit forever -- we don't rotate individual streams from one circuit to the next. Otherwise an adversary with a partial view of the network would be given many chances over time to link you to your destination, rather than just one chance.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/225Add "What attacks remain against onion routing?"2022-03-30T23:48:13ZGusAdd "What attacks remain against onion routing?"It's an interesting question, but the answer is a little bit rot,
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting
As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both you and either the destinatio...It's an interesting question, but the answer is a little bit rot,
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting
As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model.
In a more limited sense, note that if a censor or law enforcement agency has the ability to obtain specific observation of parts of the network, it is possible for them to verify a suspicion that you talk regularly to your friend by observing traffic at both ends and correlating the timing of only that traffic. Again, this is only useful to verify that parties already suspected of communicating with one another are doing so. In most countries, the suspicion required to obtain a warrant already carries more weight than timing correlation would provide.
Furthermore, since Tor reuses circuits for multiple TCP connections, it is possible to associate non anonymous and anonymous traffic at a given exit node, so be careful about what applications you run concurrently over Tor. Perhaps even run separate Tor clients for these applications.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/226Add "You should make every Tor user be a relay."2021-09-04T00:30:33ZGusAdd "You should make every Tor user be a relay."Needs to be updated https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EverybodyARelay
Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the network to handle all our users, and running a Tor relay may help your anonymity. Ho...Needs to be updated https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EverybodyARelay
Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the network to handle all our users, and running a Tor relay may help your anonymity. However, many Tor users cannot be good relays — for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients increases the size of the anonymity set.
That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past few years: Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and how much bandwidth it can offer.
There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows, and we're mostly there. See Section 4.1 of our development roadmap.
Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the research section of the volunteer page: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that switching to UDP transport is the simplest answer here — which alas is not a very simple answer at all.
Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the Challenges paper for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. Three different research papers describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as bridge relays or as normal relays), then we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our current thoughts on Tor incentives.
Please help on all of these!https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/227Add "You should transport all IP packets, not just TCP packets."2021-09-14T17:07:28ZGusAdd "You should transport all IP packets, not just TCP packets."Needs to be updated (eg, remove trac ref.)
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TransportIPnotTCP
This would be handy, because it would make Tor better able to handle new protocols like VoIP, it could solve the whole need ...Needs to be updated (eg, remove trac ref.)
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TransportIPnotTCP
This would be handy, because it would make Tor better able to handle new protocols like VoIP, it could solve the whole need to socksify applications, and it would solve the fact that exit relays need to allocate a lot of file descriptors to hold open all the exit connections.
We're heading in this direction: see this trac ticket for directions we should investigate. Some of the hard problems are:
IP packets reveal OS characteristics. We would still need to do IP-level packet normalization, to stop things like TCP fingerprinting attacks. Given the diversity and complexity of TCP stacks, along with device fingerprinting attacks, it looks like our best bet is shipping our own user-space TCP stack.
Application-level streams still need scrubbing. We will still need user-side applications like Torbutton. So it won't become just a matter of capturing packets and anonymizing them at the IP layer.
Certain protocols will still leak information. For example, we must rewrite DNS requests so they are delivered to an unlinkable DNS server rather than the DNS server at a user's ISP; thus, we must understand the protocols we are transporting.
DTLS (datagram TLS) basically has no users, and IPsec sure is big. Once we've picked a transport mechanism, we need to design a new end-to-end Tor protocol for avoiding tagging attacks and other potential anonymity and integrity issues now that we allow drops, resends, et cetera.
Exit policies for arbitrary IP packets mean building a secure IDS. Our node operators tell us that exit policies are one of the main reasons they're willing to run Tor. Adding an Intrusion Detection System to handle exit policies would increase the security complexity of Tor, and would likely not work anyway, as evidenced by the entire field of IDS and counter-IDS papers. Many potential abuse issues are resolved by the fact that Tor only transports valid TCP streams (as opposed to arbitrary IP including malformed packets and IP floods), so exit policies become even more important as we become able to transport IP packets. We also need to compactly describe exit policies in the Tor directory, so clients can predict which nodes will allow their packets to exit — and clients need to predict all the packets they will want to send in a session before picking their exit node!
The Tor-internal name spaces would need to be redesigned. We support onion service ".onion" addresses by intercepting the addresses when they are passed to the Tor client. Doing so at the IP level will require a more complex interface between Tor and the local DNS resolver.RotationMatrixRotationMatrixhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/228Add "You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits. "2022-03-30T23:48:25ZGusAdd "You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits. "https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
There are a few reasons we don't:
We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, the...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
There are a few reasons we don't:
We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users, they can.
Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/230Add "You should let the network pick the path, not the client."2022-03-30T23:47:50ZGusAdd "You should let the network pick the path, not the client."https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#LetTheNetworkPickThePath
No. You cannot trust the network to pick the path for relays could collude and route you through their colluding friends. This would give an adversary the ability...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#LetTheNetworkPickThePath
No. You cannot trust the network to pick the path for relays could collude and route you through their colluding friends. This would give an adversary the ability to watch all of your traffic end to end.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/231Add "Exit policies should be able to block websites, not just IP addresses."2022-03-30T23:47:58ZGusAdd "Exit policies should be able to block websites, not just IP addresses."https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#BlockWebsites
It would be nice to let relay operators say things like "reject www.slashdot.org" in their exit policies, rather than requiring them to learn all the IP address space that ...https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#BlockWebsites
It would be nice to let relay operators say things like "reject www.slashdot.org" in their exit policies, rather than requiring them to learn all the IP address space that could be covered by the site (and then also blocking other sites at those IP addresses).
There are two problems, though. First, users could still get around these blocks. For example, they could request the IP address rather than the hostname when they exit from the Tor network. This means operators would still need to learn all the IP addresses for the destinations in question.
The second problem is that it would allow remote attackers to censor arbitrary sites. For example, if a Tor operator blocks www1.slashdot.org, and then some attacker poisons the Tor relay's DNS or otherwise changes that hostname to resolve to the IP address for a major news site, then suddenly that Tor relay is blocking the news site.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/234Update Support portal onion service link to v3 in README.md2021-08-23T16:29:33ZGusUpdate Support portal onion service link to v3 in README.mdAs v2 onions are being removed, we need to update the site onion service in [README.md](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/blob/master/README.md) file:
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/
New onion: http://rzuwtpc4wb3xdzrj3...As v2 onions are being removed, we need to update the site onion service in [README.md](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/blob/master/README.md) file:
http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/
New onion: http://rzuwtpc4wb3xdzrj3yeajsvm3fkq4vbeubm2tdxaqruzzzgs5dwemlad.onion/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/237Add snowflake-client.exe to antivirus allowlist2021-09-04T16:18:05ZGusAdd snowflake-client.exe to antivirus allowlistSome users are reporting that their [Windows Defender](https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/of1gu3/windows_defender_latest_tor_browser_bundle/) is removing/messing up with their Tor Browser 10.5 because of `snowflake-client.exe`.
We sh...Some users are reporting that their [Windows Defender](https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/of1gu3/windows_defender_latest_tor_browser_bundle/) is removing/messing up with their Tor Browser 10.5 because of `snowflake-client.exe`.
We should update our recommendations here:
https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-10/Tor Browser: 10.5https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/240Operators "How do I change my bridge distribution method"2021-07-31T06:20:07ZGusOperators "How do I change my bridge distribution method"It's quite common to have bridge operators asking about bridge distribution methods on the Tor relay mailing list.
We should create a new support entry.
Example: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-July/019745.htmlIt's quite common to have bridge operators asking about bridge distribution methods on the Tor relay mailing list.
We should create a new support entry.
Example: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-July/019745.htmlkulsoom.zahrakulsoomzahra24@gmail.comkulsoom.zahrakulsoomzahra24@gmail.comhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/241Remove GetTor XMPP support2021-07-14T18:39:06ZGusRemove GetTor XMPP supportWe no longer support XMPP and that probably won't change in the near future.
Let's remove this from the docs:
https://support.torproject.org/gettor/gettor-4/We no longer support XMPP and that probably won't change in the near future.
Let's remove this from the docs:
https://support.torproject.org/gettor/gettor-4/kulsoom.zahrakulsoomzahra24@gmail.comkulsoom.zahrakulsoomzahra24@gmail.comhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/243Add moat to the glossary2021-09-01T14:45:05ZemmapeelAdd moat to the glossaryWe should add a definition of moat for the glossaryWe should add a definition of moat for the glossaryhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/245README.md - Update wiki pages link2021-09-14T16:16:48ZGusREADME.md - Update wiki pages linkUpdate all the docs references to the new wiki:
```
## Contributing
- [Compile a local version of the site](http://eweiibe6tdjsdprb4px6rqrzzcsi22m4koia44kc5pcjr7nec2rlxyad.onion/web/tpo/wikis/Compiling-a-local-version-of-the-website) (c...Update all the docs references to the new wiki:
```
## Contributing
- [Compile a local version of the site](http://eweiibe6tdjsdprb4px6rqrzzcsi22m4koia44kc5pcjr7nec2rlxyad.onion/web/tpo/wikis/Compiling-a-local-version-of-the-website) (clone the correct repository).
- [Developing on the site](http://eweiibe6tdjsdprb4px6rqrzzcsi22m4koia44kc5pcjr7nec2rlxyad.onion/web/tpo/wikis/How-to-develop-on-the-website)
- [How to write the content - edition tips and best practices for content creation](http://eweiibe6tdjsdprb4px6rqrzzcsi22m4koia44kc5pcjr7nec2rlxyad.onion/torproject/web/tpo/wikis/Writing-the-content)
- [Documentation on how to install, modify and use websites from the Tor project.](http://eweiibe6tdjsdprb4px6rqrzzcsi22m4koia44kc5pcjr7nec2rlxyad.onion/tpo/web/wiki)
```
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/wiki/-/wikis/home
Source: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/blob/master/README.mdemmapeelemmapeelhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/246Improve and update HTTP or SOCKS Proxy documentation2021-10-07T12:57:16ZemmapeelImprove and update HTTP or SOCKS Proxy documentationIn https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-47/ we are giving too much information, and we are not providing simple instructions for users. We should:
- [x] Remove mentions of HTTPAuthenticator that is deprecated in favor of the HTTPS fla...In https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-47/ we are giving too much information, and we are not providing simple instructions for users. We should:
- [x] Remove mentions of HTTPAuthenticator that is deprecated in favor of the HTTPS flavor
- [ ] Add a code snippet as an example on how to connect to a proxy with authentication
- [x] Maybe link to https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
- [ ] Make everything simpler to understandhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/257[Misc] Mention the anon-ticket portal in 'How to report bugs'2021-09-08T20:20:38Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Misc] Mention the anon-ticket portal in 'How to report bugs'On [How to Report a Bug or Give Feedback (in the section 'GitLab')](https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/#gitlab), I believe, we should mention the [Anon-Ticket Portal](https://anonticket.onionize.space/) and how it can be...On [How to Report a Bug or Give Feedback (in the section 'GitLab')](https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/#gitlab), I believe, we should mention the [Anon-Ticket Portal](https://anonticket.onionize.space/) and how it can be used to submit bug reports in an anonymous manner.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/260[Get in Touch] Update the irc nick verification docs2022-06-30T13:30:57Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Get in Touch] Update the irc nick verification docsWith the latest changes to oftc with regards to nick verification (see: https://github.com/oftc/oftc-web/blob/gh-pages/_posts/2021-09-15-update.md), running `/msg nickserv checkverify` is not required anymore. We need to update the docum...With the latest changes to oftc with regards to nick verification (see: https://github.com/oftc/oftc-web/blob/gh-pages/_posts/2021-09-15-update.md), running `/msg nickserv checkverify` is not required anymore. We need to update the documentation reflecting that fact, here: https://support.torproject.org/get-in-touch/why-i-cant-join-tor-channels/championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/280Discourage more running a browser in parallel to Tor Browser2022-11-30T16:52:28ZGeorg KoppenDiscourage more running a browser in parallel to Tor BrowserWe have https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-17/ for answering the question about whether it is safe to running a different browser in parallel to Tor Browser.
It's correct that *Tor Browser's* privacy features are unaffected by that ...We have https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-17/ for answering the question about whether it is safe to running a different browser in parallel to Tor Browser.
It's correct that *Tor Browser's* privacy features are unaffected by that but we should stress more the risk of linking both browsing activities.
Maybe something like
```
If you run Tor Browser and another browser at the same time, it won't affect Tor's performance or privacy properties. However, be aware that when using Tor and another browser at the same time, your Tor activity could be linked to your non-Tor (real) IP from the other browser, simply by moving your mouse from one browser into the other. Or you may imply forget and accidentally use that non-private browser to do something that you intended to do in Tor Browser instead.
```
Thanks to `ForMariosTheHacker` at h1 to point that out.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/273Update documentation with the new TB 11 release2022-03-15T18:02:37Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgUpdate documentation with the new TB 11 releaseSimilar to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/manual/-/issues/112, we need to update screenshots and instructions in the Support Portal as well.Similar to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/manual/-/issues/112, we need to update screenshots and instructions in the Support Portal as well.championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/271Add Matrix bridged channels2021-12-21T19:44:15ZGusAdd Matrix bridged channelsNow that we have publicly announced Matrix support, we should mention that on our user documentation.
https://blog.torproject.org/entering-the-matrixNow that we have publicly announced Matrix support, we should mention that on our user documentation.
https://blog.torproject.org/entering-the-matrixchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/261[Censorship] Recommend users to include 'private bridges' in the subject line...2021-09-22T18:32:19Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Censorship] Recommend users to include 'private bridges' in the subject line of the emailOn frontdesk, tickets with the subject/body in non-ASCII characters ends up in spam and that includes emails from our Chinese users writing the email in their locale. In https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/, w...On frontdesk, tickets with the subject/body in non-ASCII characters ends up in spam and that includes emails from our Chinese users writing the email in their locale. In https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/, we can suggest users to include *"private bridges"* in the subject line.
*...3. Private and unlisted obfs4 bridges: users will need to request a private bridge to frontdesk@torproject.org **with "private bridges" in the subject line** or...*championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/263[HTTPS] Duplicate phrase2022-01-20T01:36:49Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[HTTPS] Duplicate phraseAs a user on [twitter](https://twitter.com/dejacrypto/status/1444273178549891076) pointed out, on https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/, the phrase *"The/This visualization shows what information is visible to eavesdroppers with ...As a user on [twitter](https://twitter.com/dejacrypto/status/1444273178549891076) pointed out, on https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/, the phrase *"The/This visualization shows what information is visible to eavesdroppers with and without Tor Browser and HTTPS encryption."* appears twice in subsequent lines.championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/266Changing options order Snowflake > Private obfs4 bridges > meek-azure2021-10-12T19:14:39ZGusChanging options order Snowflake > Private obfs4 bridges > meek-azure13:20 < meskio> ggus: I was looking at https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/
13:20 < meskio> planning to remove meek, shouldn't snowflake be the first option?
13:21 < meskio> or are we worried is new and we tru...13:20 < meskio> ggus: I was looking at https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/
13:20 < meskio> planning to remove meek, shouldn't snowflake be the first option?
13:21 < meskio> or are we worried is new and we trust more meekGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/267Update "How do I volunteer with Tor Project?"2022-04-28T18:00:33ZGusUpdate "How do I volunteer with Tor Project?"Let's update this entry URL to `/misc/volunteer-with-tor`
And add this content:
```
A few things everyone can do now:
1. Please consider [running a relay](https://community.torproject.org/relay/) to help the Tor network grow.
1. Tell ...Let's update this entry URL to `/misc/volunteer-with-tor`
And add this content:
```
A few things everyone can do now:
1. Please consider [running a relay](https://community.torproject.org/relay/) to help the Tor network grow.
1. Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run [onion services](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/). Get them to tell their friends.
1. If you like Tor's goals, please take a moment to [donate](https://donate.torproject.org) to support further Tor development. We're also looking for more sponsors - if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies, or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications security, let them know about us.
1. We're looking for more [good examples of Tor users](https://community.torproject.org/user-research/persona/) and Tor use cases. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us, we'd love to hear from you.
### Documentation
1. Help [localize](https://community.torproject.org/localization/) the documentation into other languages. See [becoming a Tor translator](https://community.torproject.org/localization/becoming-tor-translator/) if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.
### Advocacy
1. The tor community uses [public mailing lists](https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo) and IRC channels ([join via Tor](https://www.oftc.net/Tor/)), like [tor-talk](https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk) ([#tor on irc.oftc.net](irc://irc.oftc.net/tor)), [tor-relays](https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays) ([#tor-relays](irc://irc.oftc.net/tor-relays)), [tor-dev](https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev) ([#tor-dev](irc://irc.oftc.net/tor-dev)), or [tbb-dev](https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tbb-dev), and summarize noteworthy changes into articles for our blog and [newsletter](https://newsletter.torproject.org/).
1. Create a presentation that can be used for various user [group meetings](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/) around the world.
1. Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is, or how to use it. Some have already started on [Tor's Media server](https://media.torproject.org/video/), [Howcast](http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy/), and [YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/user/TheTorProject).
1. Create a poster around a theme, such as "Tor for Freedom!"
1. Create a t-shirt design that incorporates ["Congratulations! You are using Tor!"](https://check.torproject.org/) in any language.
1. Spread the word about Tor at a symposium or conference and use these [Tor brochures](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/kit/) as conversation starter.
```
https://support.torproject.org/misc/misc-14/GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/285unify tor installation per platform2024-03-28T00:29:36Znyxnorunify tor installation per platform<!--
* Use this issue template for suggesting new docs or updates to existing docs.
-->
### Problem to solve
<!-- Include the following detail as necessary:
-->
* What feature(s) affected?
* What docs or doc section affected? Include ...<!--
* Use this issue template for suggesting new docs or updates to existing docs.
-->
### Problem to solve
<!-- Include the following detail as necessary:
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* What feature(s) affected?
* What docs or doc section affected? Include links or paths.
* Is there a problem with a specific document, or a feature/process that's not addressed sufficiently in docs?
* Any other ideas or requests?
There is not unified tor installation per package manager. One can find for OpenBSD on the `relay/setup/guard` and `relay/setup/bridge`, in which the instructions differ.
### Further details
<!--
* Include use cases, benefits, and/or goals for this work.
* If adding content: What audience is it intended for? (What roles and scenarios?)
-->
* https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/guard/openbsd/
* https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/openbsd/
### Proposal
<!-- Further specifics for how can we solve the problem. -->
My proposal is to maintain a tor/installation or any other name to instruct on ho to install tor per platform. The relay/setup guides will refer to this documentation and them they will slim down to just contain information about how to configure the wanted relay type.
### Who can address the issue
<!-- What if any special expertise is required to resolve this issue? -->
@gus if possible, create a page https://community.torproject.org/tor/pkg-manager or something like it.ebanamebanam@torproject.orgebanamebanam@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/275Dead link on FAQ2022-01-13T18:10:35ZcypherpunksDead link on FAQOn main page of support website, in section named "Gmail warns me that my account may have been compromised", there is a link to fscked.org, which seems to be a long-dead mikeperry's website.On main page of support website, in section named "Gmail warns me that my account may have been compromised", there is a link to fscked.org, which seems to be a long-dead mikeperry's website.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/277Replace `master` by `main` at https://support.torproject.org/apt/2021-11-23T13:54:46ZjugaReplace `master` by `main` at https://support.torproject.org/apt/Following the instructions at https://support.torproject.org/apt/ will fail with `E: The repository 'https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-bullseye Release' no longer has a Release file.`
The reason, as hackerncod...Following the instructions at https://support.torproject.org/apt/ will fail with `E: The repository 'https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-bullseye Release' no longer has a Release file.`
The reason, as hackerncoder pointed out, is that the release has changed from master to main. So `tor-nightly-master-<DISTRIBUTION>` text should be replaced with `tor-nightly-main-<DISTRIBUTION>`
I'm not sure this issue belongs here or to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues.GusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/282[Onion Services] Remove mentions of v2 onions in 'I cannot reach X.onion!'2022-06-30T13:22:14Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.org[Onion Services] Remove mentions of v2 onions in 'I cannot reach X.onion!'In '[I cannot reach X.onion!](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-3/)', we should remove the phrase "... make sure that you have entered the 16-character.." as v2 onion services have been [deprecated](https://suppo...In '[I cannot reach X.onion!](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-3/)', we should remove the phrase "... make sure that you have entered the 16-character.." as v2 onion services have been [deprecated](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/v2-deprecation/).
"If you cannot reach the onion service you desire, make sure that you have entered the 56-character onion address correctly; even a small mistake will stop Tor Browser from being able to reach the site....."championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/278Add instructions for refreshing pgp key2023-05-15T14:39:38ZboklmAdd instructions for refreshing pgp keyOn https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ we explain how to fetch the key used to sign Tor Browser releases. However, we don't explain how to refresh that key, for example to get a new subkey.On https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/ we explain how to fetch the key used to sign Tor Browser releases. However, we don't explain how to refresh that key, for example to get a new subkey.championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/303Add new terms to the glossary wrt TB 11.5 release2022-08-01T18:58:01Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgAdd new terms to the glossary wrt TB 11.5 releaseWe should add these new terms that we are introducing with the TB 11.5 release to the [glossary](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/):
1. Connection Assist
2. Connection Test
3. Bridge-moji
..and also this term:
1. Quickstart ...We should add these new terms that we are introducing with the TB 11.5 release to the [glossary](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/):
1. Connection Assist
2. Connection Test
3. Bridge-moji
..and also this term:
1. Quickstart (checking it allows Tor Browser to connect automatically)championquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/308[Apt] Update instructions on "Can I use APT over Tor?"2022-07-26T19:34:25ZGus[Apt] Update instructions on "Can I use APT over Tor?"- [x] tor nightly repository was renamed to `tor-nightly-main-<distribution>`
- [x] Fix the instructions GPG key instruction- [x] tor nightly repository was renamed to `tor-nightly-main-<distribution>`
- [x] Fix the instructions GPG key instructionGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/313Review and update the support article about circumventing censorship in China2023-10-31T16:10:20Zchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgReview and update the support article about circumventing censorship in ChinaWe should encourage users to use Connection Assist (ref. https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys-admin/-/merge_requests/7/diffs)We should encourage users to use Connection Assist (ref. https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys-admin/-/merge_requests/7/diffs)Sponsor 96: Rapid Expansion of Access to the Uncensored Internet through Tor in China, Hong Kong, & TibetGusGushttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/327Dead link to blog2023-11-06T19:25:02ZslrslrDead link to bloghttps://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-22/
contains 404 not found link to https://blog.torproject.org/why-tor-is-slow
It is not even on archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20220715000000*/https://blog.torproject.org/why-tor-is-slow
I a...https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-22/
contains 404 not found link to https://blog.torproject.org/why-tor-is-slow
It is not even on archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20220715000000*/https://blog.torproject.org/why-tor-is-slow
I am unsure if the article is still present: https://www.ecosia.org/search?addon=firefox&q=tor+blog+why+tor+is+slow+site%3Ablog.torproject.org
Though the https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-22/ should contain some more answer to the question in its title..https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/329Review support entries for Tor Browser 12.5 release2023-06-23T14:57:09ZGusReview support entries for Tor Browser 12.5 releasechampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orgchampionquizzerchampionquizzer@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/331update obfs4proxy to lyrebird in the documentation2023-07-17T13:36:04Zebanamebanam@torproject.orgupdate obfs4proxy to lyrebird in the documentationIn "[My antivirus or malware protection is blocking me from accessing Tor Browser](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-10/)", we need to replace `obfs4proxy` with `lyrebird` since https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-bro...In "[My antivirus or malware protection is blocking me from accessing Tor Browser](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-10/)", we need to replace `obfs4proxy` with `lyrebird` since https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/40869. I checked executable names for
- windows `lyrebird.exe`
- macOS `lyrebird`ebanamebanam@torproject.orgebanamebanam@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/335Update Tor Browser binary's naming scheme2024-03-12T18:03:49Zebanamebanam@torproject.orgUpdate Tor Browser binary's naming schemeWith Tor Browser 13 (https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/40829), we have a specific naming scheme for Tor Browser binaries. This ticket is to track and update all instances of it in the Support Portal.With Tor Browser 13 (https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/40829), we have a specific naming scheme for Tor Browser binaries. This ticket is to track and update all instances of it in the Support Portal.ebanamebanam@torproject.orgebanamebanam@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/330Mention that Orbot is no longer required to run Onion Browser on iOS2024-02-27T11:40:25Zebanamebanam@torproject.orgMention that Orbot is no longer required to run Onion Browser on iOSWith [version 3.0 of Onion Browser](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser/issues/423), users also need to install Orbot. We should mention this in our documentation: "[Can I run Tor Browser on an iOS device?](https://support.torpr...With [version 3.0 of Onion Browser](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser/issues/423), users also need to install Orbot. We should mention this in our documentation: "[Can I run Tor Browser on an iOS device?](https://support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-3/)"
Update: It's no longer required to have Orbot + Onion Browser, but if you have Orbot installed, Onion Browser will ask permission to use it. We will need to update the documentation.ebanamebanam@torproject.orgebanamebanam@torproject.orghttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/338Improve on the differences between TB and using other browsers with a system Tor2023-11-13T16:04:16ZemmapeelImprove on the differences between TB and using other browsers with a system TorThe page https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-9/ could have:
- More information about cookie isolation, no history, etc
- A better URL
- That graph with all the non-tor-related privacy features Tor Browser hasThe page https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-9/ could have:
- More information about cookie isolation, no history, etc
- A better URL
- That graph with all the non-tor-related privacy features Tor Browser hashttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/347non-apostrophe apostrophes (and similar non-ascii quotes)2023-11-08T01:27:35ZRoger Dingledinenon-apostrophe apostrophes (and similar non-ascii quotes)We have a mixture of ```'``` and ```’``` in our support entries.
This produces surprising behavior -- for example the recent !174 diff shows
```
-title: I can’t connect to Tor Browser. Is my network censored?
+title: I can’t connect...We have a mixture of ```'``` and ```’``` in our support entries.
This produces surprising behavior -- for example the recent !174 diff shows
```
-title: I can’t connect to Tor Browser. Is my network censored?
+title: I can’t connect to Tor with Tor Browser, is my network censored?
```
which probably isn't what anybody expected to see in a diff.
I assume the ```’``` snuck in via a paste from google docs or microsoft word or the like.
We should unify on one, and imo it should be the actual ascii apostrophe character (decimal 39).
I also wonder what the translations have done with this mixed-apostrophe situation.
We also have similar issues in the tb-manual, including mixed non-ascii quotes in adjacent sentences, e.g.: ```Users who require a high degree of security in their web browsing should set Tor Browser’s [Security Level](../security-settings/) to “Safer” (which disables JavaScript for non-HTTPS websites) or “Safest” (which does so for all websites). However, disabling JavaScript will prevent many websites from displaying correctly, so Tor Browser’s default setting is to allow all websites to run scripts in "Standard" mode.```https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/357Add HashRing to the glossary2024-02-13T20:36:21ZemmapeelAdd HashRing to the glossaryWe need to add HashRing to the glossary, there are some contents that mention it on passing and most of the readers and translators think it is a typo of hashing, but it is not:
```
14:19 < nina13[m]> hi! There is a glossary term to tr...We need to add HashRing to the glossary, there are some contents that mention it on passing and most of the readers and translators think it is a typo of hashing, but it is not:
```
14:19 < nina13[m]> hi! There is a glossary term to translate "hashring" (https://hosted.weblate.org/translate/tor/glossary/ru/?checksum=3b2b6b707f90ff59)
currently it is translated in Russian and other eastern european languages as "hashing". So I wonder is it just "hashing" or hashRing like in Rust (https://docs.rs/hashring/latest/hashring/)
14:32 < = trinity-1686a> "hashing" wouldn't be a good translation. Scouting the internet, I found two instances of "Хэшринг" which seems more
accurate, I couldn't find any other translation that seemed correct (but I don't speak a word of russian)
14:38 < trinity-1686a> it's related to the concept of "consistent hashing". There is a picture on
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consistent_hashing#Basic_technique which explain why the name hash+ring (you hash something, treat the
result as a position on a ring. To know where to store your thing, you walk on the ring until you find a server)
```Jérôme Charaouilavamind@torproject.orgJérôme Charaouilavamind@torproject.org