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Gus
Tor
Commits
d0ccf760
Commit
d0ccf760
authored
21 years ago
by
Roger Dingledine
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edits on active attacks
svn:r773
parent
1520e93c
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doc/tor-design.tex
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-41
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d0ccf760
...
...
@@ -1482,16 +1482,16 @@ need for this approach, when
the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to
all of their nodes
\cite
{
jap-backdoor
}
.
\emph
{
Run a recipient.
}
B
y running a webserver
, an adversary
\emph
{
Run a recipient.
}
An adversar
y running a webserver
trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and
can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses.
This can greatly
facilitate e
nd-to-end attacks:
I
f the adversary can induce
can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses.
E
nd-to-end attacks
become easier
:
i
f the adversary can induce
users to connect to his webserver (perhaps by advertising
content targeted
a
t those users), she now holds one end of their
connection.
Additionally, t
here is a danger that
the
application
protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
information
about the initiator. Tor d
oes not aim to solve this latter problem;
we depend on Privoxy and similar protocol cleaners
.
content targeted t
o
those users), she now holds one end of their
connection.
T
here is
also
a danger that application
protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
information
about the initiator. Tor d
epends on Privoxy and similar protocol cleaners
to solve this latter problem
.
\emph
{
Run an onion proxy.
}
It is expected that end users will
nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some
...
...
@@ -1507,44 +1507,27 @@ by attacking non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce
their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy.
The best defense here is robustness.
\emph
{
Run a hostile node.
}
In addition to being a
local observer, an isolated hostile node can create circuits through
itself, or alter traffic patterns to affect traffic at
other nodes. (Its ability to directly DoS a neighbor is now limited
by bandwidth throttling.) Nonetheless, in order to compromise the
anonymity of a circuit by its observations, a
hostile node must be immediately adjacent to both endpoints.
If an adversary can
\emph
{
Run a hostile OR.
}
In addition to being a local observer,
an isolated hostile node can create circuits through itself, or alter
traffic patterns to affect traffic at other nodes. Nonetheless, a hostile
node must be immediately adjacent to both endpoints to compromise the
anonymity of a circuit. If an adversary can
run multiple ORs, and can persuade the directory servers
that those ORs are trustworthy and independent, then occasionally
some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another
as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
anonymity is compromised for those circuits. If an adversary
as the end of a circuit. If an adversary
controls
$
m>
1
$
out of
$
N
$
nodes, he should be able to correlate at most
$
\left
(
\frac
{
m
}{
N
}
\right
)
^
2
$
of the traffic in this way---although an
adversary
could possibly attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic
by running an OR with an unusually permissive exit policy.
%% Duplicate.
%
%\emph{Run a hostile directory server.} Directory servers control
%admission to the network. However, because the network directory
%must be signed by a majority of servers, the threat of a single
%hostile server is minimized.
\emph
{
Selectively DoS a Tor node.
}
As noted, neighbors are
bandwidth limited; however, it is possible to open enough
circuits converging at a single onion router to
overwhelm its network connection, CPU, or both.
% We aim to address something like this attack with our congestion
% control algorithm.
by running an OR with an unusually permissive exit policy, or by
degrading the reliability of other routers.
\emph
{
Introduce timing into messages.
}
This is simply a stronger
version of passive timing attacks already discussed earlier.
\emph
{
Tagging attacks.
}
A hostile node could ``tag'' a
cell by altering it.
This would render it unreadable, but i
f the
cell by altering it.
I
f the
stream were, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site,
the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time would confirm
the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent
...
...
@@ -1552,7 +1535,7 @@ this attack.
\emph
{
Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.
}
When
relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node
can impersonate the target server.
Thus c
lients
can impersonate the target server.
C
lients
should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication.
\emph
{
Replay attacks.
}
Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable
...
...
@@ -1560,11 +1543,11 @@ to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake
will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
of the recorded session can't be used.
\emph
{
Smear attacks.
}
An attacker could use the Tor network
to
engage in
socially disapproved acts,
so as to try
to bring the
entire
network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
Exit policies
can help
reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
ultimately
,
the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
\emph
{
Smear attacks.
}
An attacker could use the Tor network
for
socially disapproved acts, to bring the
network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
Exit policies reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
ultimately the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
some political heat.
\emph
{
Distribute hostile code.
}
An attacker could trick users
...
...
@@ -1573,7 +1556,7 @@ their connections---or worse, could trick ORs into running weakened
software that provided users with less anonymity. We address this
problem (but do not solve it completely) by signing all Tor releases
with an official public key, and including an entry in the directory
list
ing
which versions are currently believed to be secure. To
that
list
s
which versions are currently believed to be secure. To
prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself
(through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all
releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and
...
...
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