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Tor
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87fda0b6
Commit
87fda0b6
authored
20 years ago
by
Paul Syverson
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svn:r3600
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doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
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87fda0b6
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@@ -380,9 +380,14 @@ transporting arbitrary IP packets, and also supported
pseudonymity in addition to anonymity; but it has
a different approach to sustainability (collecting money from users
and paying ISPs to run Tor nodes), and was eventually shut down due to financial
load. Finally,
more scalable peer-to-peer designs like Tarzan~
\cite
{
tarzan:ccs02
}
and
MorphMix~
\cite
{
morphmix:fc04
}
have been proposed in the literature, but
load. Finally,
%potentially more scalable
% [I had added 'potentially' because the scalability of these designs
% is not established, and I am uncomfortable making the
% bolder unmodified assertion. Roger took 'potentially' out.
% Here's an attempt at more neutral wording -pfs]
peer-to-peer designs that are intended to be more scalable,
for example Tarzan~
\cite
{
tarzan:ccs02
}
and
MorphMix~
\cite
{
morphmix:fc04
}
, have been proposed in the literature but
have not been fielded. These systems differ somewhat
in threat model and presumably practical resistance to threats.
Note that MorphMix differs from Tor only in
...
...
@@ -889,7 +894,9 @@ prevent individual machines within the enclave from running Tor
clients~
\cite
{
or-jsac98,or-discex00
}
.
Of course, Tor's default path length of
three is insufficient for these enclaves, since the entry or exit
three is insufficient for these enclaves, since the entry and/or exit
% [edit war: without the ``and/'' the natural reading here
% is aut rather than vel. And the use of the plural verb does not work -pfs]
themselves are sensitive. Tor thus increments path length by one
for each sensitive endpoint in the circuit.
Enclaves also help to protect against end-to-end attacks, since it's
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