We considerably changed Tor Browser behavior when moving from FQDN isolation to binding identifiers and circuits to the base domain. We should update the design document and include a motivation for this move.
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Trac: Summary: Update Tor Browser design documentation for 4.5.1 to Update Tor Browser design documentation for 5.0 Keywords: TorBrowserTeam201506 deleted, TorBrowserTeam201508 added
While reading some recent and older papers about tracking on the internet and defenses against it it occurred to me we should update our No filters section pointing to these papers and explaining our point in more detail. We should somewhere mention as well that it is hard to make the difference between non-tracking and tracking third parties and only trying to take care of the latter as some approaches try to do. But I think this road is a dead-end as well which we should not go.
for the idea to bind client side identifiers to the URL bar domain. Our solution is a bit more strict than their "No Spatial Tracking across Domain and Limited Temporal Tracking"-one but the underlying idea is the same.
We should update section 6 of our specific fingerprinting defenses (fonts) as we actually don't ship our broken patch anymore (Gábor Gulyás pointed me to that, thanks).
What is the reason to hide current development of the design documentation from TBB community?
Maybe, it's better to start with the Working Draft v0.1 rather than trying to produce the Release in the dark?
Mike: I guess the website traffic fingerprinting parts could need an update as well. Those are the only ones I left untouched as I am not up-to-date wrt the current state of the art of available defenses/attacks.