This fix looks good, and I think it should be backported to 0.2.4.
I also don't think it needs a new release, because we're not actually overwriting country with the geoip_add_entry() stack. But we get within 6 bytes of overwriting it.
If the IPv6 addresses were both short, then the geoip_add_entry() stack could overwrite country, and leak pointer values: it allocates 3 pointers on the stack (24 bytes on x86_64, 12 bytes on i386).
But the shortest line is 32 characters (did we have shorter lines in earlier files?), which means that the earliest country could start is at buf+30.
Ah, but wait: pointers must be aligned on word boundaries, and we've added a call to geoip_add_entry() to the stack, as well as any registers we've saved, and any stack smashing protection, any any other compiler bookkeeping.
But I haven't been able to reproduce it locally using clang, macOS, x86_64, and my diagnostic branch assert-country with the command src/or/tor DisableNetwork 1 GeoIPv6File src/config/geoip6, even with two 2-character IPv6 addresses.
So I think this could trigger in rare circumstances, but common configs are safe.
But remember those weird countries we were getting in some relay descriptors?
Did we ever track that down?
This could be it.