Because Tor's path selection chooses inner nodes first, and then excludes those nodes from being used in outer hops, over many circuits, outer hops get information about the choice of inner hops/guards.
We need to reverse the selection of nodes in the loop circuit_establish_circuit() in order to fix this.
This isn't as bad as it might otherwise be, because the last hop already is chosen first in that function. So it is a little tricky to take advantage of this info leak.
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I think we're still thinking about path restrictions for prop291. We may still want this... Otoh, I suppose we could close and then open new tickets for prop291 as needed.
Trac: Milestone: Tor: 0.3.4.x-final to Tor: unspecified