org/projects/Tor/TLSHistory.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 For a few reasons, TLS as it stands is a difficult protocol for Tor to use.
 
-== REASON 1: IT IS HARD TO LOOK LIKE OTHER TLS INSTANCES FROM THE POV OF PASSIVE ATTACKS ==
+## REASON 1: IT IS HARD TO LOOK LIKE OTHER TLS INSTANCES FROM THE POV OF PASSIVE ATTACKS
 
 The first is that TLS exists in a stupendously vast number of
 externally visible profiles.  If you're running a protocol that an
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ I'll go through the history of the stupid ways that Tor has tried to
 use TLS over the years.  This will read like a comedy of errors;
 please don't judge our missteps too harshly.
 
-=== Stage 1: (Tor versions 0.0.1 through 0.2.0.19) ===
+### Stage 1: (Tor versions 0.0.1 through 0.2.0.19)
 
 What we would really
 like to do, if we didn't need to worry about censorship, is to have a
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ RFC2409, section 6.2.
 
 We made some concessions to avoiding fingerprinting during this phase. For example, we removed some fixed strings from our certificates' DNs.
 
-=== Stage 2: (Tor 0.2.0.20 through 0.2.3.6) ===
+### Stage 2: (Tor 0.2.0.20 through 0.2.3.6)
 Our particular use of two-certificate chains, our unusual cipher list,
 and our our funny-looking certs made Tor pretty easy to profile.
 
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2009-November/015864.html
 Protocol details at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/130-v2-conn-protocol.txt
 
-=== Stage 3: (Tor 0.2.3.6 to present) ===
+### Stage 3: (Tor 0.2.3.6 to present)
 
 When we started getting detected and blocked based on our use of
 renegotiation, we switched to an improved handshake, where the outer
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ if we didn't need to blend in with other TLS handshakes.
 Protocol details at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/176-revising-handshake.txt
 
-=== Stage 4: ===
+### Stage 4:
 
 There are more features that are getting used to distinguish Tor from
 other TLS traffic.  They include:
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ other TLS traffic.  They include:
 
 We're hoping to address these in 0.2.4.x.
 
-== REASON 2: IT IS HARD TO RESIST ACTIVE PROBING ==
+## REASON 2: IT IS HARD TO RESIST ACTIVE PROBING
 
 Most censorious attackers are passive, and seem to be using modified
 commercial software to detect and block Tor connections.  On the other
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ complete the handshake ... or to even confirm that it isn't talking to
 a regular webserver.  The presentation of this information can't be
 visible to a passive observer.
 
-== SOME OBVIOUS AND NOT-SO-OBVIOUS POINTS: ==
+## SOME OBVIOUS AND NOT-SO-OBVIOUS POINTS:
 
 There are, as near as I can tell, two main classes of censorious
 adversary: the GFW, and everybody else.  Everybody else seems either