Tor protects your privacy on the internet by hiding the connection between your Internet address and the services you use. We believe Tor is reasonably secure, but please ensure you read the instructions and configure it properly. To build Tor from source: ./configure && make && make install Home page: https://www.torproject.org/ Download new versions: https://www.torproject.org/download.html Documentation, including links to installation and setup instructions: https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html Making applications work with Tor: https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO Frequently Asked Questions: https://www.torproject.org/faq.html https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ
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The Tor Project / Core / Tor
23449 commits behind the upstream repository.

Nick Mathewson
authored
Right-shifting negative values has implementation-defined behavior. On all the platforms we work on right now, the behavior is to sign-extend the input. That isn't what we wanted in auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1; Fix for 6861; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha; reported pseudonymously. The broken behavior didn't actually hurt anything, I think, since the only way to get sign-extension to happen would be to have the top bit of descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] set, which would make the value of descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4 somewhere between 0b11111111 and 0b11111000 (that is, between -1 and -8). So auth_type_val would be between -7 and 0. And the immediate next line does: if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) { So the incorrectly computed auth_type_val would be rejected as invalid, just as a correctly computed auth_type_val would be. Still, this stuff shouldn't sit around the codebase.
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