Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >=
sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate
sun_path.  This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the
kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't
nul-terminated.  Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode.  Instead, we
should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path.

Coverity found this; it's CID 428.  Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.

When we rejected a descriptor for not being the one we wanted, we
were letting the parsed descriptor go out of scope.

Found by Coverity; CID # 30.

Bugfix on 0.2.1.26.

(No changes file yet, since this is not in any 0.2.1.x release.)

I'm not one to insist on C's miserly stack limits, but allocating a
256K array on the stack is too much even for me.

Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha.  Found by coverity.  Fixes CID # 450.

otherwise you scp a tarball up but only one version of the website has it.

This reverts commit 507c1257.

This reverts commit 40cfad1b.

debug-level since it will be quite common. logged at both client
and server side. this step should help us track what's going on
with people filtering tor connections by our ssl habits.

Jérémy Bobbio authored 13 years ago and Nick Mathewson committed 13 years ago

Original message from bug3393:

check_private_dir() to ensure that ControlSocketsGroupWritable is
safe to use. Unfortunately, check_private_dir() only checks against
the currently running user… which can be root until privileges are
dropped to the user and group configured by the User config option.

The attached patch fixes the issue by adding a new effective_user
argument to check_private_dir() and updating the callers. It might
not be the best way to fix the issue, but it did in my tests.

(Code by lunar; changelog by nickm)

intrigeri authored 13 years ago and Nick Mathewson committed 13 years ago

Fix for bug 3369.

If rep_hist_buffer_stats_write() was called unitinitalized, we'd leak
memory.

This was harmless, we never compared it to anything but itself or 0.
But Coverity complained, and it had a point.

Coverity warned about it, it's harmless to comment out.

George Kadianakis notes that if you give crypto_rand_int() a value
above INT_MAX, it can return a negative number, which is not what
the documentation would imply.

The simple solution is to assert that the input is in [1,INT_MAX+1].
If in the future we need a random-value function that can return
values up to UINT_MAX, we can add one.

Fixes bug 3306; bugfix on 0.2.2pre14.

When we added the check for key size, we required that the keys be
128 bytes.  But RSA_size (which defers to BN_num_bytes) will return
128 for keys of length 1017..1024.  This patch adds a new
crypto_pk_num_bits() that returns the actual number of significant
bits in the modulus, and uses that to enforce key sizes.

Also, credit the original bug3318 in the changes file.