David Goulet authored 9 years ago and Nick Mathewson committed 9 years ago

In a nutshell, since a circuit can not exit at its entry point, it's very
easy for an attacker to find the hidden service guard if only one EntryNodes
is specified since for that guard, the HS will refuse to build a rendezvous
circuit to it.

For now, the best solution is to stop tor to allow a single EntryNodes for
an hidden service.

Fixes #14917

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>

Fixes 16965

(found thanks to teor's chutney haxx)

Thanks to Roger for spotting this!

Thanks to Roger for spotting this!

HiddenServiceStatistics option is now set to "1" by default.

Fixes #15254

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>

I was going to add a test for this, but I realized that it had no
users.  So, removed.

Make "bridges+hs" the default test network. This tests almost all
tor functionality during make test-network, while allowing tests
to succeed on non-IPv6 systems.

Requires chutney commit 396da92 in test-network-bridges-hs.

Closes tickets 16945 (tor), 16946 (chutney) . Patches by "teor".

In validate_recommended_package_line, at this point in the function,
n_entries is always >= 1.  Coverity doesn't like us checking it for
0.

CID 1268063.

CID 1301373

Fixes CID 1306915, which noticed that the check was dead.

The function now unconditionally allocates a new extend_info_t.
This should convince coverity that we're not leaking memory.
(CID 1311875)

channel_unregister() removes channels from the current smartlist while
we're in a SMORTLIST_FOREACH loop. This only works by accident.

If the chutney and tor sources are side-by-side in the same
parent directory, autodetect the chutney path.

Closes ticket 16903. Patch by "teor".