- Apr 03, 2015
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(Sending a nak would be pointless.) See ticket 15515 for discussion.
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- Feb 24, 2015
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Nick Mathewson authored
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- Feb 16, 2015
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- Jan 23, 2015
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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- Jan 22, 2015
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Karsten Loesing authored
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Karsten Loesing authored
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- Jan 08, 2015
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Nick Mathewson authored
Also, avoid crashing when we attempt to double-remove an edge connection from the DNS resolver: just log a bug warning instead. Fixes bug 14129. Bugfix on 0d20fee2, which was in 0.0.7rc1. jowr found the bug. cypherpunks wrote the fix. I added the log message and removed the assert.
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- Nov 24, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Karsten Loesing authored
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Karsten Loesing authored
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- Nov 19, 2014
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micah authored
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- Nov 12, 2014
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- Oct 20, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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- Oct 19, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
See also http://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=141357408522028&w=2
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- Oct 16, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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- Oct 15, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
The POODLE attack doesn't affect Tor, but there's no reason to tempt fate: SSLv3 isn't going to get any better.
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- Sep 20, 2014
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Roger Dingledine authored
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- Sep 16, 2014
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Clients now send the correct address for their chosen rendezvous point when trying to access a hidden service. They used to send the wrong address, which would still work some of the time because they also sent the identity digest of the rendezvous point, and if the hidden service happened to try connecting to the rendezvous point from a relay that already had a connection open to it, the relay would reuse that connection. Now connections to hidden services should be more robust and faster. Also, this bug meant that clients were leaking to the hidden service whether they were on a little-endian (common) or big-endian (rare) system, which for some users might have reduced their anonymity. Fixes bug 13151; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.
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- Aug 13, 2014
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Karsten Loesing authored
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Karsten Loesing authored
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- Aug 09, 2014
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Roger Dingledine authored
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- Jul 28, 2014
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Roger Dingledine authored
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Roger Dingledine authored
Those used to be normal to receive on hidden service circuits due to bug 1038, but the buggy Tor versions are long gone from the network so we can afford to resume watching for them. Resolves the rest of bug 1038; bugfix on 0.2.1.19.
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- Jul 27, 2014
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Roger Dingledine authored
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- Jul 25, 2014
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Roger spotted this on tor-dev in his comments on proposal 221. (Actually, detect DESTROY vs everything else, since arma likes network timeout indicating failure but not overload indicating failure.)
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This makes FastFirstHopPK an AUTOBOOL; makes the default "auto"; and makes the behavior of "auto" be "look at the consensus."
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- Jul 24, 2014
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This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end of the 'cipherid' array. This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having any uninitialized reads. (Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code entirely.) Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
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Roger Dingledine authored
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