Fingerprinting and Accessibility
This is a general issue to discuss the impact resist fingerprinting (RFP) is having on accessibility. Maybe we can organise some research and link related issues.
On the surface, there is a potential conflict between the goal of "make every user look the same online" and the fact that lots of users have different needs and usage patterns. But there could be some room for improvement and creative thinking.
Some initial thoughts:
- Tor browser is not only an anti-tracking tool. We want to make sure that users who need it for something else are not kept out by RFP.
- Some decisions made for RFP also effect accessibility. For example, we force CSS media queries (prefers-contrast, prefers-color-scheme, prefers-reduced-motion).
- Can we choose better values?
- Can we allow for punching some holes in these?
- Can we add some noise so that users who can handle either value can adopt random values to give users who need a specific value some cover?
- Can we hack in some accessibility features that are undetectable to web content. E.g. a simple one would be to inverse colors or lower contrast at the
xul:browser
level. - Can we offer users guidance on tools outside of tor browser that improve accessibility without raising fingerprinting. E.g. tools that operate at the desktop level outside of web page's control, like magnifiers and color filters.
- Users of accessibility tools can end up standing out in any behaviour analysis. E.g. if you navigate with a keyboard, then the website will receive a lot of Tab and arrow key events. Can we give them better cover?
/cc @donuts @clairehurst @dan @ma1 @pierov @morgan @tjr @thorin