howto/yubikey.md

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ N/A
 
 The YubiKeys keep private cryptographic information embedded in the
 key, for example RSA keys for the SSH authentication mechanism. Those
-keys are supposed to be impossible to extract from the Yubikey, which
+keys are supposed to be impossible to extract from the YubiKey, which
 means they are also impossible to backup.
 
 ## Queues
@@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ the secret key material is available on the backup YubiKey.
 
 ## Other documentation
 
- * [Anarcat's old (2015) Yubikey howto](https://anarc.at/blog/2015-12-14-yubikey-howto/)
- * [A Yubikey cheatsheet](https://debugging.works/blog/yubikey-cheatsheet/)
+ * [Anarcat's old (2015) YubiKey howto](https://anarc.at/blog/2015-12-14-yubikey-howto/)
+ * [A YubiKey cheatsheet](https://debugging.works/blog/yubikey-cheatsheet/)
  * [TPA-RFC-53][] and [discussion ticket](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/41083)
 
 [TPA-RFC-53]: policy/tpa-rfc-53-security-keys
@@ -347,16 +347,16 @@ were compromised by hacking into key people's accounts and destroying
 critical data or introducing vulnerabilities in their software. Those
 organisations had 2FA enabled, but attackers were able to bypass that
 security by hijacking their phones, which is why having a
-cryptographic token like a Yubikey is important.
+cryptographic token like a YubiKey is important.
 
 We also don't necessarily provide people with the means to more
 securely store their (e.g. SSH) private keys, used commonly by
 developers to push and sign code. So we are considering buying a bunch
-of Yubikeys, bringing them to the next Tor meeting, and training
+of YubiKeys, bringing them to the next Tor meeting, and training
 people to use them.
 
 There's all sorts of pitfalls and challenges in deploying 2FA and
-YubiKeys (e.g. "i lost my yubikey" or "omg GnuPG is hell"). We're not
+YubiKeys (e.g. "i lost my YubiKey" or "omg GnuPG is hell"). We're not
 going to immediately solve all of those issues. We're going to get
 hardware into people's hands and hopefully train them with U2F/FIDO2
 web 2FA, and maybe be able to explore the SSH/OpenPGP side of things
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ successfully attack the Tor project.
 ### Future work
 
 Ideally, there would be a rugged *and* open-hardware device that could
-simultaneously offer the tamper-resistance of the Yubikey while at the
+simultaneously offer the tamper-resistance of the YubiKey while at the
 same time providing an auditable hardware platform.
 
 ## Technical debt and next steps