RPC: Implement cookie authentication
- Jan 15, 2025
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
Also fix a bug in decoding, where we accepted too-short strings.
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
We don't want to call this "unix path" anywhere, since it corresponds to _any_ case where the ability to negotiate a successful connection means that the client is authorized. We also don't want to call it "none": The authentication is inherent to the connection, not nonexistent.
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Nick Mathewson authored
Previously participants in the cookie protocol only bound the peer nonce in their MACs. With this change, they bind both nonces. This change is _probably_ not necessary for security, but it can't hurt. It follows a general principle that Adam Langley told me a long time ago: you won't regret binding more, but you might regret binding less.
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Nick Mathewson authored
Since this is a secret value, it's probably best not to copy it all over the place.
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
(Since Windows doesn't have unix sockets, this is the option that will work everywhere.)
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
Now that we have a solid idea of how connections happen, it's clear we won't need to enable this negotiation mechanism.
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Nick Mathewson authored
Conforms to rpc-cookie-sketch.md.
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Nick Mathewson authored
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Nick Mathewson authored
We want to load cookies only after we've connected and gotten a banner.
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Nick Mathewson authored
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