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tpa rfc 41 schleuder retirement

Last edited by Antoine Beaupré 
title: TPA-RFC-41: Schleuder retirement
costs: staff
approval: TPA, community council, security team.
affected users: schleuder users
deadline: None
status: rejected
discussion: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/issues/40564

Summary: replace Schleuder with GitLab or regular, TLS-encrypted mailing lists

Background

Schleuder is a mailing list software that uses OpenPGP to encrypt incoming and outgoing email. Concretely, it currently hosts five (5) mailing lists which include one for the community council, three for security issues, and one test list.

There are major usability and maintenance issues with this service and TPA is considering removing it.

Issues

  • Transitions within teams are hard. When there are changes inside the community council, it's difficult to get new people in and out.

  • Key updates are not functional, partly related to the meltdown of the old OpenPGP key server infrastructure

  • even seasoned users can struggle to remember how to update their key or do basic tasks

  • Some mail gets lost. some users write email that never gets delivered, the mailing list admin gets the bounce, but not the list members which means critical security issues can get misfiled

  • Schleuder only has one service admin

  • the package is actually deployed by TPA, so service admins only get limited access to the various parts of the infrastructure necessary to make it work (e.g. they don't have access to Postfix)

  • Schleuder doesn't actually provide "end-to-end" encryption: emails are encrypted to the private key residing on the server, then re-encrypted to the current mailing list subscribers

  • Schleuder attracts a lot of spam and encryption makes it possibly harder to filter out spam

Proposal

It is hereby proposed that Schleuder is completely retired from TPA's services. Two options are given by TPA as replacement services:

  1. the security folks migrate to GitLab confidential issues, with the understanding we'll work on the notifications problems in the long term

  2. the community council migrates to a TLS-enforced, regular Mailman mailing list

Rationale

The rationale for the former is that it's basically what we're going to do anyways; it looks like we're not going to continue using Schleuder for security stuff anyways, which leaves us with a single consumer for Schleuder: the community council. There, I propose we setup a special mailman mailing list that will have similar properties to Schleuder:

  • no archives
  • no moderation (although that could be enabled of course)
  • subscriptions requires approval from list admins
  • transport encryption (by enforced TLS at the mail server level)
  • possibility of leakage when senders improperly encrypt email
  • email available in cleartext on the mailserver while in transit

The main differences from Schleuder would be:

  • no encryption at rest on the clients
  • no "web of trust" trust chain; a compromised CA could do an active "machine in the middle" attack to intercept emails
  • there may be gaps in the transport security; even if all our incoming and outgoing mail uses TLS, a further hop might not use it

That's about it: that's all Schleuder gives us compared to an OpenPGP based implementation.

Personas

TODO: make personas for community council, security folks, and the peers that talk with them.

Alternatives considered

Those are the current known alternatives to Schleuder that are currently under consideration.

Discourse

We'd need to host it, and even then we only get transport encryption, no encryption at rest

GitLab confidential issues

In tpo/team#73 (closed), the security team is looking at using GitLab issues to coordinate security work. Right now, confidential issues are still sent in cleartext (tpo/tpa/gitlab#23), but this is something we're working on fixing (by avoiding sending a notification at all, or just redacting the notification).

This is the solution that seems the most appropriate for the security team for the time being.

Improving Schleuder

Mailman with mandatory TLS

A mailing list could be downgraded to a plain, unencrypted Mailman mailing list. It should be a mailing list without archives, un-moderated, but with manual approval for new subscribers, to best fit the current Schleuder implementation.

We could enforce TLS transport for incoming and outgoing mail on that particular mailing list. According to Google's current transparency report (as of 2022-10-11), between 77% and 89% of Google's outbound mail is encrypted and between 86% to 93% of their inbound mail is encrypted. This is up from about 30-40% and 30% (respectively) when they started tracking those numbers in January 2014.

Email would still be decrypted at rest but it would be encrypted in transit.

Mailman 3 and OpenPGP plugin

Unfinished, probably unrealistic without serious development work in Python

Matrix

Use encrypted matrix groups

RT

it supports OpenPGP pretty well, but stores stuff in cleartext, so also only transport encryption.

Role key and home-made Schleuder

This is some hack with a role email + role OpenPGP key that remails encrypted email, kind of a poor-man's schleuder. Could be extremely painful in the long term. I believe there are existing remailer solutions for this like this in Postfix.

A few solutions for this, specifically:

Shared OpenPGP key alias

Another option here will be to have an email alias and to share the private key between all the participants of the alias. No technology involved in the server or private material there. But a bit more complicated to rotate people (mostly if you stop trusting them) and a lot of trust in place for the members of the alias.

Signal groups

This implies "not email", leaking private phone numbers, might be great for internal discussions, but probably not an option for public-facing contact addresses.

Maybe a front phone number could be used as a liaison to get encrypted content from the world?

Alternatives not considered

Those alternatives came after this proposal was written and evaluated..

GnuPG's ADSK

In March 2023, the GnuPG projected announced ADSK, a way to tell other clients to encrypt to multiple of your keys. It doesn't actually answer the requirement of a "mailing list" per se, but could make role keys easier to manage in the future, as each member could have their own subkey.

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